University of Alberta

Xenophon's Leadership in the *Anabasis*

by

Christopher H. Petrik

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Xenophon's Leadership in the *Anabasis* submitted by Christopher H. Petrik in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Ancient History.

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ABSTRACT

Xenophon's *Anabasis*, telling of the accounts and happenings of the Ten Thousand, allows us to see in detail the elements of piety, strategy, and methods of leadership employed by Xenophon that enabled him to lead back safely the Greeks to their homeland. These examples can then be compared to the ideals of leadership that Xenophon professed in his other works, such as the *Cyropaedia*, the *Hellenica*, the *Agesilaus*, and the *Hipparchicus*. What becomes clear is that Xenophon did adhere to these ideals, and that he was an extremely able and efficient leader, who was instrumental in the development of the theory of leadership. As well, it is shown that Xenophon was a multi-faceted writer, whose other interests and skills make the *Anabasis* a complex work, encompassing elements of an apologia, a work on panhellenism, and a treatise on leadership and the ideal community.

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INTRODUCTION

The story of the March of the Ten Thousand is a fascinating one, as recounted by Xenophon the Athenian. The *Anabasis* tells the story of a group of Greek mercenaries and their return from the heart of Persia. The Greeks found themselves in Persia after having seen their employer Cyrus the Younger die at the hands of his brother Artaxerxes in the Battle of Cunaxa in 401 B.C. The account of the march to Cunaxa occupies only the first book of the *Anabasis*; thus it is safe to say that the real subject of the work, as the title suggests, is the retreat of the Greeks. True to its title, which means "the march up country", the *Anabasis* recounts the story of the Greeks' successful return to Trapezus and of their march along the coast of the Black Sea to the Bosporus.

The *Anabasis* speaks not so much of Greek history, although the March of the Ten Thousand was an important part of history, as of the trials and tribulations of a mercenary army, unprecedented in size. Through the story of this expedition we learn of Xenophon, the individual who became largely responsible for leading the Greeks back home safely through numerous hardships. By following the events of the Ten Thousand we can gain an understanding of the details of the expedition, knowledge that is necessary to understand better the details of the army and of its individuals. Having examined the journey of the Ten Thousand as well as the numerous hardships suffered by them, we can then begin to focus more directly on the elements of Xenophon's leadership, including his piety, military tactics and strategy, and his means and methods of discipline. These in turn provide us with concrete details that we can use in the analysis and understanding of Xenophon's leadership.

Before we attempt to analyze Xenophon's leadership skills, we have to look at what he considered to be a good general by looking at some of his other works, such as the *Hellenica,* the *Hipparchicus*, the *Agesilaus*, and the *Cyropaedia.* In these works Xenophon makes evident what he considered to be the aspects of genuine leadership. As well, through a study of individuals such as Agesilaus, Jason of Pherea, Cyrus the Younger, and Cyrus the Elder, we can gain a fuller understanding of

Xenophon's feelings about what makes a good general, and also a noble and virtuous individual.[1] By comparing Xenophon's actions and deeds to those that he prescribed as being good and just, we can see whether Xenophon was a good leader and whether he did live up to the expectations that he had set for others. To make this more clear we can also contrast Xenophon's leadership with the less than ideal leadership of individuals such as Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon and Chirisophus. Finally we should look briefly at Xenophon after the March and attempt to see why he did things the way that he did.

Xenophon has often been compared to other Greek historians and found to be secondary. Anderson claims that in almost all respects Xenophon is far inferior to his predecessors.[2] When he has been compared with Thucydides his historical works have often been found insufficient and wanting.[3] Certain scholars thus clearly hold the opinion that his writings are not in the same class as Herodotus or Thucydides.[4] As H.D. Westlake points out, many scholars agree that the *Hellenica* is, as an historical work, a failure.[5] The actual leadership of Xenophon has been looked at before, by scholars such as Anderson, Nussbaum, and Wood, yet it seems that Xenophon is still considered a mediocre historian with some military interests and skills.[6] It is thus

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[1] Though Xenophon did not know Cyrus the Elder personally, he presents him as if he did. This portrayal was most likely based on what Xenophon had heard about Cyrus, as well as what Xenophon would have wished him to have been like. According to Robert Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History.* (Washington 1973) 119, Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* portrays Cyrus the Elder as an idealized soldier-statesman equipped with all the virtues which Xenophon recognized. If this is true, then Cyrus the Elder certainly would have embodied the characteristics of an able general and a worthy and just person.

[2] J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1970) 9. Anderson's reasoning rests on his claim that many of Xenophon's historical accounts are quite superficial, and that Xenophon often did not take the time to investigate stories that he heard and instead passed them off as the truth; e.g., *Anabasis* 3.4.8-12.

[3] E.g., Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny, an Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero* (New York 1963) 25.

[4] E.g., Peter Connolly, *Greece and Rome at War* (London 1981) 11.

[5] H.D. Westlake, 'Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*', *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (New York 1969) 208. M.I. Finley, *The Greek Historians* (New York 1959) 14, claims that the *Hellenica* is "very unreliable, tendentious, dishonest, dreary to read, and rarely illuminating on broader issues."

[6] Neal Wood, 'Xenophon's Theory of Leadership', *C&M* 25 (1964) 33-64. G.B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden 1967). J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (New York 1974) 120-134. Cf. Higgins, who states that though Xenophon may entertain and amuse, he can hardly educate and inspire. William E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis.* (Albany 1977) 1.

important to look at Xenophon as a general, and in turn to analyze his leadership. The picture that we get is that Xenophon was an able general who was very successful in leading the Greeks back home. In addition, we will be able to see what Xenophon's worth as an historian and literary figure was and to gain some insight into what the other reasons that he wrote the *Anabasis* may have been. Having studied these aspects of Xenophon's leadership and of the *Anabasis*, we can then begin to understand better Xenophon as an historian and a leader, and in turn to gain a greater appreciation of him and of the *Anabasis*.

I

A BACKGROUND TO XENOPHON AND THE MARCH OF THE TEN THOUSAND

Xenophon the historian must first be looked at as an historical figure to understand more completely the situation that presented itself to him prior to his undertaking of the March of the Ten Thousand. Unfortunately, not very much is known of the childhood of Xenophon, though we do know that he was born into a wealthy Athenian family, the son of Gryllus, probably between 430 and 425 B.C.[1] If Xenophon was indeed born around 430 B.C., then we should keep in mind that his birth coincided with the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and thus the great war must have somehow influenced Xenophon (in ways that we shall see later). In addition to the Peloponnesian War, another influence shaped the life of Xenophon: Socrates and his teachings. Diogenes Laertius (2.48) writes that early in his life Socrates encountered and questioned Xenophon, and Xenophon, upon learning of his own ignorance became a friend of Socrates from that time on.[2] By virtue of the fact that Xenophon was born into the class of the Knights and raised in a wealthy Athenian family, a promising military career in the cavalry would have been common for an individual like him, who was able to maintain a horse.[3] His aristocratic background also enabled Xenophon to spend more time studying and learning, as opposed to working in a trade in order to support himself. Thus Xenophon's early years provided him with a chance to study the teachings and beliefs of Socrates, to enrich his mind

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[1] Diogenes Laertius, 2.48. Diogenes does not state the specific year in which Xenophon was born; however, he does state that he flourished in the 94th Olympiad: 401- 400 B.C. If we bear in mind that Xenophon most likely was involved in cavalry service at Ionia in 410 B.C., then he could have been born in 425 at the latest, since a boy younger than fifteen would have had no place in the cavalry. Furthermore, based on what Xenophon says in *Anabasis* 1.3.25, that he was considered too young to be a general as opposed to Proxenus, who was thirty years old (*Anab.* 2.6.19), we can gather that Xenophon was somewhat younger that Proxenus, who would have been born in 430 B.C. We in turn can place Xenophon's birth between 430 - 425 B.C. Edouard Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris 1957) 24, is of the opinion that Xenophon's birth was in 426 B.C., though he states that this is not certain. All references are to the *Anabasis* unless otherwise noted.

[2] J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974) 9.

[3] George Cawkwell, Introduction and Notes to *Xenophon: A History of My Times*. Trans. by Rex Warner. (London 1979) 8.

with various subjects, and to observe more closely the political and military life in Athens. Xenophon probably began his lessons in horsemanship while accompanying his father on sojourns into the country, and these early lessons influenced Xenophon enough to be involved with cavalry for the remainder of his life.

Xenophon was not as directly involved in the war as others because of his youth and the fact that he was 'training' to become a country gentleman. However, it should be noted that frequent raids from the Peloponnese did affect the estate of Gryllus, as they did the majority of Athenian landowners.[4] Xenophon describes the occupation of Decelea in 413 B.C. as a turning point in Athenian history, though his family was not ruined by the war as other families must certainly have been (*Poroi* 4.25). At this time, while Xenophon was making the progression from childhood to adolescence, he began to realize the greater effects of the war, from which he had previously been somewhat shielded due to his background. We should remember that while other youths of Xenophon's age were more directly involved in the War, Xenophon in turn was developing his views on education, economics, and politics as befitted one from the aristocratic class. This aristocratic upbringing surely then not only paved the way for Xenophon's views in the long run, but in the short term it also prevented him from realizing the full effects of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon is believed to have taken part in the Peloponnesian War in its later years and he probably saw active military service as a cavalryman in the defense of his city during the final years of the war.[5] He then was involved in an attempt to rescue the Athenians who were blockaded at Mytilene, though this attempt landed Xenophon in Boeotia as a prisoner of war.[6] It is quite possible that Xenophon may have been released from Boeotia due to his friendship with Proxenus, which was based on ancient familial ties.

Xenophon may have been back in Athens in 406 B.C., and thus witnessed the arrival of the Paralus (*Hellenica* 2.2.3-40) which brought the disastrous news to Athens that Lysander had destroyed her navy. Cawkwell writes that it is possible that Xenophon was present at the trial of the generals in Athens in 406 B.C. (*Hell.* 1.7),

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[4] J. Antrich and S. Usher, *Xenophon: The Persian Expedition* (Bristol 1978) 7.
[5] Neal Wood, 'Xenophon's Theory of Leadership', *C&M* 24/25 (1963-64) 34.
[6] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 1.12 .

and that almost certainly he was in Athens in 404 B.C.[7] Cawkwell's claim rests on the fact that Xenophon's description of cavalry action in Ionia (*Hell.* 1.2) is quite precise and so tends to indicate that in 409 B.C. Xenophon was old enough for military service and for the right to attend debates held in the assembly, such as the debate of the generals. Krentz also writes that though we cannot be certain whether Xenophon was in Athens in 404/3 B.C., it seems likely that he was.[8] The reasoning behind this again depends upon the specific details Xenophon gives in the *Hellenica* of the Ionian campaign in 410 B.C., the battle of Arginousai in 406 B.C., and the arrival of the Paralus in 405 B.C. Xenophon by now seems to have begun his 'career' as an historian by keeping track of events of the counter revolution in Athens over the next few years. Xenophon's *Hellenica* (2.3-4.) gives a quite detailed account of these events, though again it is difficult to say to what extent Xenophon may have been involved in them.[9]

While these events were taking place in Athens, it is likely that Xenophon began to grow disillusioned with the political situation in his mother city. It is possible that at first Xenophon thought that the Thirty would bring about necessary reforms, but later upon seeing the extremist measures of Critias, he began to feel doubts.[10] Anderson claims that Xenophon's descriptions of the counter-revolution at Athens (*Hell.* 2.3-4) tell us indirectly a great deal about Xenophon's own views and disposition.[11] It seems then that Xenophon's sympathies may have been with the moderate oligarchs,[12] since he was somewhat critical of the Athenian democracy and at the same time viewed the rule of the Thirty as being too harsh. His feelings likely were with the Spartan State, which embodied much of the aristocratic ideal.[13] This

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[7] Cawkwell (1979) 9.
[8] Peter Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika I-II.3.10.* (Warminster 1989) 1.
[9] The question of Xenophon's political feelings at the end of the fifth century as presented by him in the *Hellenica* is a complicated one. Xenophon's accounts in the *Hellenica* of the counter-revolution at Athens (2.3.10ff) are quite detailed; however, Xenophon wrote about these events at least thirty years after they had taken place. It is quite possibe that during this time some of Xenophon's political views would have changed and he may have altered his account of his possible involvements in these events.
[10] Anderson (1974) 48-50.
[11] Ibid. 47.
[12] Cawkwell (1979) 10.
[13] Anderson (1974) 43.

would suggest that Xenophon realized that he could not be happy in Athens with the present political situation, and may have been desirous of leaving Athens for some time.[14] As well, Xenophon was aware that the Athenians would not have looked kindly upon individuals with pro-Spartan sentiments.

At around this time Xenophon's long-time friend Proxenus, who had supposedly rescued Xenophon from his Boeotian imprisonment, was interested in the prospect of marching with Cyrus the Younger and invited Xenophon to join him. Xenophon, whether simply bound by ancient ties of friendship or for reasons not completely clear, nevertheless obliged his friend and he too decided to accompany Cyrus; however, as Xenophon points out, he set out on the expedition as neither a captain, a general, nor a private soldier (3.1.4). Prior to deciding whether or not to accompany Cyrus, Xenophon consulted the oracle at Delphi regarding the expedition; however, Xenophon asked the oracle *in what way* he should seek service with Cyrus as opposed to *whether* he should do so. Though Socrates at first was displeased with Xenophon for the manner in which he consulted the oracle, Socrates finally did advise him to go (Diogenes Laertius 2.50). Xenophon also recounts this story and claims that Socrates thought that Xenophon's association with Cyrus might involve complaints at Athens for him (3.1.5-11). Socrates' opinions were based on the idea that Cyrus had helped the Spartans in their war with Athens, and so the Athenians would view association with Cyrus as being anti-Athenian. Xenophon though did not heed Socrates' advice and having decided to leave Athens, set out to Sardis. Antrich and Usher claim that this offer of travel, adventure, and perhaps enrichment, seemed to meet all of Xenophon's physical and psychological needs at that time of his life, and so he set out with Cyrus.[15]

In order to understand better the military developments that surrounded Xenophon when he joined Cyrus' expedition, we should look at the military situation

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[14] Cawkwell (1979) 9-10, claims that Xenophon's descriptions of these events in the *Hellenica* (2.3.15-56, 3.1.4) suggest that overall Xenophon probably was critical of both the democracy and the oligarchy and found both political ideas unappealing.

[15] Antrich and Usher 8. More will be mentioned about Xenophon's disillusionment with Athens in Chapter Three.

around the time of Xenophon. For the most part, between the seventh century B.C. and the fourth, the essential principles of land warfare remained the same in southern Greece,[16] heavy infantry battles. In the fifth century the Peloponnesian War contributed to certain military changes throughout Greece. Before the Peloponnesian War the army was made up of 'citizen hoplites', men who fought when they were needed by their city, but otherwise lived daily lives as farmers, carpenters, or other such men. As Archer Jones points out, Greek soldiers had full time occupations as farmers, tradesmen, and artisans; in addition they were responsible for furnishing their own equipment.[17] According to Demosthenes, during the Peloponnesian War the Spartans and the other Greeks fought for four or five months in the summer; they would invade, ravage the countryside with a hoplite army and then return home again.[18] A major difference between Sparta and other city states was that Sparta trained its young men strenuously in order to achieve the utmost excellence and discipline in warfare; consequently the Spartans were superior to all others before the Peloponnesian War and stood out as a nation of professionals.[19] After the Peloponnesian War, other states such as Athens began to employ training methods similar to those practiced by Sparta, namely training in tactical maneuvers and arms training. As Lazenby points out, it was only after the battle of Leuctra that the Thebans seriously began to train.[20] Certain progressions in Greek military practices then began to evolve during the Peloponnesian War, the main one of these being the change from amateur to professional soldiers. Delbrück claims that as long and varied as the Peloponnesian War was, professionalism was the one new aspect of the art of war that it brought to Greece.[21] An aspect of professionalism that arose during the Peloponnesian War concerns the matter of campaigning. In previous instances the

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[16] J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (London 1970) 13.
[17] Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana and Chicago 1987) 2.
[18] Demosthenes, *Third Philippic* 48.
[19] Anderson (1970) 6.
[20] J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) 24. Cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.5.23.
[21] Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War: Warfare in Antiquity* Vol. 1. Trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln and London 1990) 149. Cf. Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479 - 323 BC* (London and New York 1983) 157, who states that professionalism began during the Peloponnesian War.

majority of battles were fought within close proximity to the city-states involved in these wars. However, as is evidenced by the Sicilian expedition, during the Peloponnesian War certain battles were fought away from home for long periods of time which necessitated professional soldiers. A soldier who could not remain away from his home for months at a time to devote himself fully to the causes of war was not as valuable as a soldier with no domestic ties whose life was in essence with the army. Along with the rise of professional soldiers came the increased use of mercenaries. Simply put, mercenaries were professional soldiers who offered their services in other campaigns that did not affect them directly. Mercenaries were used before the Peloponnesian War, as can be seen in the use of Greek mercenaries by King Amasis of Egypt.[22] As well, in the fifth century Persian satraps regularly hired Greek soldiers.[23] Even in Greece the use of professional soldiers as mercenaries had been seen in the rules of the tyrants Pisistratus of Athens (Herodotus 1.61), and Polycratus of Samos (Herodotus 3.39).[24] It seems though that the use of mercenaries and professional soldiers grew mainly after the Peloponnesian War and developed more in the fourth century.

When the Peloponnesian War ended and many citizen hoplites found their lands destroyed or seized, they in turn became mercenaries out of economic necessity. After having been away from home on a campaign for a number of years, it is possible that they were accustomed to lives as soldiers, and thus were in search of other campaigns to embark on.[25] These campaigns were often found in foreign countries such as Persia, where the eastern monarchs came to recognize the technical superiority of the hoplite armament and formation.[26] As Parke states, the Persian local governors needed military support, and they found it in Greek mercenaries who proved themselves superior to any Asian infantry.[27] This can be seen in the actual Ten

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[22] Anderson (1970) 166-167.
[23] H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933) 6.
[24] Delbrück 149.
[25] As shall be seen in Chapter Three, Clearchus is an excellent example of a mercenary soldier. Xenophon writes that Clearchus remained in Greece only as long as the Spartans and Athenians were at war, and after peace had been reached, Clearchus went north to fight against the Thracians (2.6.2).
[26] Yves Garland, *War in the Ancient World.* Trans. Janet Lloyd, (London 1975) 94.
[27] Parke 21.

Thousand, as Cyrus was able to bankroll a vast number of men to aid him in his attempted usurpation. In addition to the beginning of the developments in mercenary service, there were others such as the increased use of light-armed troops.

Xenophon's time was an era in which the Greeks began to make greater use of peltasts.[28] Anderson writes that after the Peloponnesian War the importance of peltasts was increased, and the extensive use of peltasts outside their own native land soon followed.[29] Though the developments in mercenary service were more directly related to the Ten Thousand than were the developments of light-armed troops, the increased use of peltasts was beneficial to the successes of the Greeks. With the arrival of peltasts came the use of missile weapons, such as arrows, slings, and javelins. In the *Anabasis* we see the use of Rhodian slingers who played an indispensable role in the battles against the Persians (3.4.15). As well, the successful use of light-armed troops can be seen in 1.10.7, which describes how the maneuverable peltasts were able to withstand a charge from Tissaphernes without suffering any casualties. It is quite likely that the Greeks would have suffered much greater losses without any light-armed troops. For the most part, much like professional soldiers and mercenaries, the use of light-armed infantry also developed further in the early fourth century, after the Peloponnesian War.

One other aspect which ties in more closely to Xenophon is the change in generalship. Generalship did not really evolve much before the time of Xenophon and the Peloponnesian War; however, Xenophon himself did help in advancing some of the changes in leadership and generalship which developed throughout the fourth century. Archaic battles and skirmishes definitely did not rely on the skill of the general as much as late fifth-and-fourth century battles did. There were several reasons why generalship was slow to develop before the fourth century according to Hornblower. First, classical Greek battles were fought by citizen hoplites, without reserves, and so the unity of the battleline depended on solidarity and the holding of the line by the hoplites.[30] In a situation such as this, the general would have found it difficult to

[28] Lazenby 38.
[29] Anderson (1970) 114.
[30] Hornblower 160.

influence the mass of soldiers. Each soldier knew that to prove victorious the battleline must be maintained without being broken. Quite simply, this battle tactic was relatively basic and thus no great strategy on the part of the general was needed. We should consider that even the Spartans did not give any formal training in tactics or strategy to their generals.[31] Second, if a general did lead his army from the front line, he would have been very hard pressed to send out messages and to direct the course of the army in the midst of the battle.[32] As Hanson points out, in the sixth and fifth centuries the commanding officer had very few tactical options once the two sides had met,[33] and he thus had to hope that his original strategy would prove victorious. Hornblower's third theory ties in well with the Greek political system, and shows the union between the state and the military. As he claims, the Greek city states were extremely reluctant to grant autocratic powers to one man, lest that individual might try to attain a tyrannical rule. Even in Sparta the king was held accountable for any misdemeanors or wrongdoings in a battle.[34] For the above reasons the pre-fourth-century Greek general was a man with set powers who more often than not organized and led his men in routine tactics and strategies on the battlefield.

Bearing in mind the 'set pattern' that was employed by the Greek generals during the archaic period, we should now look at the general during the Peloponnesian War at the time of Xenophon, before the actual expedition of the Ten Thousand. An important point that should be made is that the Peloponnesian War witnessed a separation of political and military leadership. It would be safe to say that generals in archaic times were usually important political figures. As Aristotle points out, an Athenian citizen became a *strategos* due to his social position and the reputations of his family (*Athenaion Politeia* 26.1). This is not surprising, since most battles were fought by citizen-hoplites, and wealthier citizens were able to afford better arms and armor. An excellent example of the connection between political and military leadership can be seen in Pericles. Almost from the very beginning of his political

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[31] Lazenby 24.
[32] Hornblower 160.
[33] Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (New York and Oxford 1989) 107.
[34] Hornblower 160.

career, Pericles also became a military commander conducting military operations.[35] These types of leaders, who had both military and political power, seem to have eventually given way to more specialized individuals; men who were either military men or politicians, but not both.

It would naturally seem that with the increased rise of professional soldiers, would also come an increase of professional commanders. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint when this change would have taken place. Parke points out that there was not yet a clear distinction between soldiers and politicians in the fifth century.[36] As strategy, tactics and weaponry developed, the office of general became a full-time job; no longer would a general who was not trained in strategy or tactics suffice. This change brought forth the professional military leader; one who concentrated exclusively on matters connected with the army and the war.[37] For example, as Anderson points out, missile weapons required special skills while close quarter fighting did not.[38] A general now had to know the capabilities of archers and slingers so as to utilize them to the best of their ability. These are the types of Greek commanders that we find in the *Anabasis*, professional leaders who were not connected with politics, but were almost exclusively involved in warfare (2.6). Granted, these leaders also had the possibility of obtaining strength and later gaining political power as a result of their military leadership;[39] however, they did not possess military and political authority simultaneously. As a result, it was now more difficult than it had been before for individuals to merge the interests of the political and military bodies. Instead, there were different individuals who each had more limited power and authority. Though it is difficult to determine the exact time, it is possible that there began to be a separation between military and political leadership near the end of the Peloponnesian War. Simply put, as military leadership became more

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[35] Wlodzimierz Lengauer, *Greek Commanders in the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C. Politics and Ideology: A Study of Militarism.* (Warsaw 1979) 30.
[36] Parke 73.
[37] Lengauer 87.
[38] Anderson (1970) 84.
[39] Lengauer 94.

specialized, there grew a need for men who were career generals and whose first interest was the army and warfare.

The actual strategical and tactical duties of the general evolved in accordance with the changes and developments in arms and weaponry. Though missile weapons were available,[40] their use became greater with the development of peltasts. It seems that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, generals began to focus all their energy on war, and began to realize how to incorporate the new weapons and soldiers into a successful army. Aside from this there were really no major changes in the art of generalship. Granted, prior to the late fifth century B.C. the Greek general had no specifically trained staff to help him in times of warfare.[41] However, as pointed out before, officers would have been hard pressed to advise the general during a battle. If anything, they could advise the general before the battle on tactics and strategy, but during battle neither the general nor his staff could do much to change the focus and direction of the mass of the battleline. This problem remained during the time of Xenophon, and for long after. As Anderson correctly points out, after the general had drawn up his men and encouraged them to the best of their ability, there was nothing more he could do except take his place in the ranks and set the best example he could.[42] The general did make use of his subordinate officers mainly in issuing orders and ensuring that they had a thorough understanding of the battle plans and of the overall campaign. The task of the general or commander-in-chief, as regards the actual battle, was thus essentially uniform and the office of the general as such had been quite long-standing. As Hanson points out, the Greek idea that the battlefield commander and his subordinates should be involved in the battle continued on for a number of centuries.[43] We should therefore now look briefly at the military history and career of Xenophon before he undertook the expedition with the Ten Thousand. By doing so we will better understand how Xenophon dealt with the military situation

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[40] Anderson (1970) 112.
[41] Ibid. 67.
[42] Ibid. 71, Xenophon *Cyropaedia*, 8.5.13.
[43] Hanson 108.

of his time, and how he effected certain changes in the generalship, leadership, and military tactics throughout the March of the Ten Thousand.

As mentioned before, Xenophon had previous military experience before the expedition with the Ten Thousand. Xenophon's military training proves valuable in helping assess the worth and credit of Xenophon's history. Though Xenophon's accounts of certain battles differ from other sources, as Tuplin states, concerning military engagements Xenophon's credit is not seriously questionable.[44] Prior to writing the accounts of these battles, he had been a brigadier of mercenaries, and most likely served as a senior staff officer in the Spartan army.[45] This would suggest that Xenophon did have some knowledge of military matters before he set out with Cyrus. As well, Xenophon surely learned more about mercenary warfare, tactics, and strategy during the march from Sardis to Cunaxa. It is thus likely that Xenophon could claim to understand better than almost any other Athenian the minute details of active service.[46] If this is indeed the case then Xenophon was well equipped to lead the Ten Thousand due to his previous experiences as both a leader and a soldier.

The actual organization of the Ten Thousand should be looked at to understand better what kind of mercenary army it was. We must realize that this Greek army was unprecedented, as never before had Greece produced such a large body of mercenary troops.[47] By examining the organization and structure of the army, we can gain a basic understanding of the Greek army that Cyrus had recruited, and which Xenophon eventually led back to Greece.

In the first chapter of the *Anabasis,* Xenophon describes how Cyrus set out to organize the Ten Thousand in order to march against his brother Artaxerxes. Cyrus, in order to avoid suspicion, organized the army in different contingents through separate individuals such as Clearchus, Aristippus, Proxenus and others (1.1.9-11).

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[44] C.J. Tuplin, 'Military Engagements in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', *Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing.* I. Moxon, J.D. Smart, A.J. Woodman (edd.) (Cambridge 1986) 65. Though Tuplin analyzes Xenophon's military accounts in the *Hellenica*, it seems safe to say that Xenophon's accounts in the *Anabasis* would be as reliable and accurate.

[45] Anderson (1970) 11.

[46] Ibid. 11.

[47] Parke 24.

Cyrus seems to have adhered to the ancient belief that the best mercenaries were from the Peloponnese, as can be seen in the collection of Greek mercenaries, of whom more than half were Arcadians and Achaeans (6.2.10). Bearing in mind that mercenary service was already quite developed at this time, it probably would not have been very hard for Cyrus to recruit such a large number of mercenaries, around 13,000 men. Xenophon also makes an interesting point concerning the mercenaries that enlisted with Cyrus. He claims that many of the soldiers joined because they had heard of Cyrus' noble character and generosity, and furthermore, that those already in the service of Cyrus were doing very well for themselves (6.4.8). In discussing the Greek army, Xenophon does mention in detail the particulars of the organization of the Ten Thousand, namely the numbers of troops and the officers and leaders.

The Greek leaders who arrived at Sardis, the beginning point of the march, with their various contingents were Clearchus, Xenias, Proxenus, Sophaenetus, Socrates and Pasion. The seventh Greek *strategos,* Menon the Thessalian, joined up with Cyrus' troops at the city of Colossae, a four days' march from Sardis (1.2). Xenophon indicates that the total number of Greeks enlisted in Cyrus' army amounted to 11,000 hoplites and 2,000 peltasts. He also mentions at this time that Sosis the Syracusan arrived at Celaenae with 300 hoplites, though he does not account for this contingent anywhere else in the *Anabasis.* It would thus seem that Sosis' troops were assimilated into one of the larger armies of a certain *strategos* and thus Sosis should not be considered as one of the initial *strategoi.*

Although the Greek mercenaries had been hired by Cyrus to fight for him, Cyrus made no attempts to combine them together into one unit under his own authority. Instead, realizing the potential problems that this might cause, Cyrus arranged that each *strategos* would command his own body of troops.[48] In addition, since Cyrus had not informed any of the Greeks, except for Clearchus, of the real purpose of the march, it was probably easier for Cyrus to keep deceiving the Greeks if they remained in separate detachments, rather than if they formed a unified body of

[48] The absence of a single commander also adhered to the system of mercenary command which was in general use at the time of Cyrus. J. Roy, 'The Mercenaries of Cyrus', *Historia* 16 (1967) 296.

13,000 men. The fact that Cyrus attempted to deceive the Greeks shows that he thought that they would not march willingly against Artaxerxes. Instead, Cyrus told them that they were marching against the Pisidians, and he may have never intended to inform the Greeks of the real purpose of the march, until they met up with the Persian king. This episode indicates poor leadership skills on the part of Cyrus, for when the Greeks found out the real purpose of the march, they refused to go on, and Cyrus almost suffered a mutiny (1.3.1). Only after Cyrus increased their pay did the Greeks continue onwards, though they now must have been less trusting of Cyrus. Out of these Greek mercenaries, a small Arcadian bodyguard of 300 hoplites commanded by Xenias of Parrhasia formed the nucleus of Cyrus' army, the elite corps on which he would rely the most.[49] Xenophon indicates that Xenias and these 300 hoplites had previously accompanied Cyrus and Tissaphernes to the Persian capital, in expectation of the death of Darius (1.1.2).[50] It was with these Greek troops that Cyrus began the organization of the larger body of Greek mercenaries (1.1.6). Among Cyrus' mercenaries, as is the case in almost every army, the larger army unit was divided into smaller divisions. Within these several smaller armies the soldiers were further divided into *lochoi*, numbering around 100 men each, though in the case of Menon's army each *lochos* consisted of 50 men. In addition, the light armed troops were divided into *taxeis*, commanded by *taxiarchs*, though the numbers in these divisions are not made evident to us by Xenophon.[51]

Xenophon's description of the march to Cunaxa is quite lengthy and explicit and needs not be repeated. However, there are certain instances and events which merit some mention as they are related more directly to Xenophon and to the study of leadership. The incident of disobedience against Clearchus which took place at Tarsus (1.3) shows how Clearchus willfully helped to deceive his fellow Greeks. Clearchus,

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[49] Parke 24.

[50] As will be seen later, it is interesting how Cyrus used the whole contingent of Greek mercenaries whom he considered to be superior soldiers to the Persians.

[51] Parke 27. We should also take into account the fact that these divisions were only temporary, dependent upon the actual number of soldiers. As Xenophon claims in 4.7.8, a rearguard division numbered about 70 men, not the supposedly usual 100 men. This diminution can almost certainly be attributed to the fact that the Greeks had already lost a significant amount of their troops, and so could not possibly maintain the same divisions with considerably fewer men.

who according to Xenophon was the only Greek who knew from the beginning the true intentions of Cyrus (3.1.10), felt that his loyalty to Cyrus was more important than truthfulness and honesty towards his fellow Greeks. If Xenophon is indeed correct about Clearchus, then his actions certainly show his lack of integrity, ethics and honesty.[52] After the incident at Tarsus we see an example of Cyrus attempting to endear himself to the Greeks, in his neglecting to punish Xenias and Pasion who deserted from the army (1.4.12). It seems that even if Cyrus had wanted to punish Xenias and Pasion, the situation prevented this. If he had done so he very well may have appeared as a tyrant as well as a liar, and in turn lost all of his Greek mercenaries. Instead Cyrus, knowing that eventually he would have to inform the Greeks of the real purpose of the march, decided to play up to the Greeks and thus to regain their trust momentarily. Cyrus' plan seems to have worked as he later put the burden of informing the mercenaries of the cause of the march on to the Greek generals. In this way Cyrus was not held directly responsible, and he thus may have prevented a mass desertion. The march through the Arabian desert shows another incident of the character of Clearchus (1.5), which further may have made him disagreeable to Xenophon. As Peter Krentz points out, Xenophon felt that fear and compulsion were not the best ways to secure loyalty.[53] It seems that Clearchus showed an abuse of his authority in his attempt to govern some of Menon's soldiers, who were not under Clearchus' direct command. As well, as the main Greek general, it was Clearchus' duty to try to keep the Greeks united; instead, by ordering one of Menon's soldiers to be beaten, he incurred the hatred of Menon's contingent and almost caused a battle among the Greeks (1.5.13-15). This incident may have further marked Clearchus as a strict disciplinarian and made him unfavorable to the Greek troops, other than his own.

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[52] We should bear in mind that while Xenophon was recording these events as an historian and as a spectator, he was able to see clearly the leadership of Clearchus in times of peace as well as in times of internal crises, such as the aforementioned mutiny. We should also keep in mind Clearchus' actions and examples so as to compare them to Xenophon's own theories and practices of leadership, once he had adopted the position of commander-in-chief, and thus to be able to recognize the similarities and differences between these two individuals. In addition, we might ask the question if Clearchus' actions before Cunaxa influenced Xenophon's opinion of him, and if so whether this affected Xenophon's portrayal of Clearchus in the Battle of Cunaxa.

[53] Krentz (146 n. 5), points out that Xenophon's view that willing obedience is better than coercion is also seen in the *Hellenica* 1.6.2-5, 5.2.18-19, 6.1.7.

With this incident we can begin to understand that Clearchus' leadership was of the type that seemed to be based on fear and operated on compulsion.[54]

The army then continued on through Babylonia and began to prepare for the imminent battle against Artaxerxes and his troops. Cyrus believed that his brother would engage him in a number of days and so he in turn reviewed all his troops and ordered Clearchus to take the right wing and Menon to take the left wing of the Greek mercenary contingent (1.7.1-2). Xenophon indicates that a count was taken, the number of Greek hoplites was 10,400 and there were 2,500 peltasts. He also claims that Cyrus' native troops numbered around 100,000 and that Cyrus also had 20 scythed chariots. Xenophon then states that Artaxerxes had 1,200,000 men and 200 scythed chariots. Plutarch claims that Ctesias, the court physician of Artaxerxes, affirmed that the king had 400,000 troops as opposed to the 1,200,000 that Xenophon claims.[55] Considering these figures, it is quite evident that they cannot be the actual numbers of the respective forces. As Graham Wylie states, an army of even 400,000 drawn up eight ranks deep would have had a battle front about 48 km long.[56] We should not though be surprised by Xenophon's figures, or even Ctesias' for that matter, as it was relatively common for ancient historians to exaggerate such figures in order to show the preeminence of one army over another, an excellent example of this is Herodotus' accounts of the Persian Wars. By increasing or decreasing the figures of either the victor or the vanquished, an historian could present a victory as being much greater and more impressive than it actually was, or else make a loss seem less remarkable and extensive than it had really been. The difficulty then arises in trying to determine the actual numbers of the armies. Modern scholars have different views on the actual figures though it seems safe to claim that Cyrus had 25,000 - 30,000 troops,

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[54] This is one of the three types of leadership that Nussbaum (110) claims there is; the second is based on trust and dependence and operates on consent, and the third is based on 'positive' feelings and operates on incentive.

[55] Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*. 13.3

[56] Graham Wylie, 'Cunaxa and Xenophon', *AC* 61 (1992) 123.

and that the king had 40,000 - 60,000; any figures that are much more exact appear to be speculation.[57]

Cyrus then marched forward with all his troops in battle order as he was expecting to meet up with the king that very day. A great factor in this assumption was that his army came upon a ditch that had been dug previously by Artaxerxes to deter Cyrus' army. However, once the army bypassed the ditch they did not see the king's army, but merely evidence of men and horses that were retreating (1.7.14). Cyrus, thinking that perhaps the great king was retreating or else that he would at least not engage him for the next few days, disassembled the battle formation in which the army was marching, and continued the march in a much more *relaxed* and *careless* fashion. The manner in which he was marching may have suited a journey through peaceful lands, but was definitely not beneficial to the situation that Cyrus was in. As a result, when Cyrus was surprised by the king's army later that day, his troops were not yet in full formation. Cyrus was then forced to organize his army into the pre-arranged battle array as quickly as possible. As Xenophon states (1.8.2), Cyrus, according to the plans that had been agreed upon, ordered Clearchus and the Greeks to be on the right wing flanked by the river Euphrates. Cyrus' native troops were then supposed to make up the remainder of the line with him in the center as all Persian commanders were accustomed to do in battle as an added measure of safety (1.8.22). Cyrus' army, having been only partially organized, thus attempted to stand its ground while the much larger army of the king approached. When he saw the size of the king's army and realized that the king's center outflanked his left wing thereby creating the threat of an envelopment, Cyrus ordered Clearchus to abandon the right flank by the river and to lead the Greek contingent against the Persian center where Artaxerxes was. Clearchus refused to obey Cyrus' change in tactic and instead led his Greeks against the Persian left wing, which they in turn routed. Cyrus, seeing the success of the Greeks, rushed against his brother and after having wounded him was in

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[57] J.M. Bigwood, 'The Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa', *AJPh* 104 (1983) 341, suggests 25,000 for Cyrus and 60,000 for Artaxerxes, Anderson (1974) 99-100 claims 20,000 and 60,000 respectively for Cyrus and the king, and Wylie (1992) 123 proposes 30,000 for Cyrus and 40,000 - 50,000 for Artaxerxes.

turn himself killed (1.8.26-27). As a result the great quest of Cyrus the Younger was over, and in essence the mercenary work of the Greeks was done as their employer had been killed.[58]

My reasoning for Cyrus's strategy is as follows: Cyrus planned to reach Babylonia before the king and thus to have the upper hand in both position and number of forces. His battle array, with the Greeks on the right, must have seemed best to him in theory. However, the king then surprised Cyrus before Cyrus had a chance to organize his troops, and thus his only hope was to try to arrange his original battle formation before the king's forces were upon him. Before Cyrus knew what was happening he was thrust into the battle with the Greeks on the right wing. Seeing how ineffective this would actually be, in a bid of desperation he ordered Clearchus to charge against the king's center, hoping that perhaps Clearchus could rescue his troubled strategy. Clearchus though, being a more experienced general, saw that Cyrus' bid was impossible and so maintained his original position, thereby actually saving the Greek forces.[59] If the Greeks had cut diagonally across the front of Cyrus' troops in order to reach the king, or even behind Cyrus' native troops, the disorder

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[58] The Battle of Cunaxa is a somewhat complex topic which presents many problems. Scholars have long thought that Clearchus was to blame for refusing to follow Cyrus' orders: George Grote, *A History of Greece* Vol. 9 of 12. (London 1852/1907) 133. H.W. Parke (32) also seems to place the blame on Clearchus and claims that Clearchus' tactics were unsuitable for the special conditions of a mercenary army on foreign service. However, the view that the blame should rest with Cyrus seems to have become more popular in the last number of years, as in Wylie (1992) 130. A major problem lies in the fact that Cyrus' army was not all in place when the first attack happened, simply because Cyrus had not anticipated the arrival of the king. The placement of the Greek mercenaries is also interesting; as Plutarch points out (*Artaxerxes* 8.6), if the king had selected the Greeks' position he could scarcely have put them in a place farther away from him where they could do any less harm. Because of the complexity of Cunaxa, I do not intend to study the battle thoroughly in this paper; rather I will present my opinions on Cyrus' disastrous strategy as it provided Xenophon with an important lesson about strategy and tactics.

[59] Plutarch provides a somewhat different account of the interaction between Clearchus and Cyrus than does Xenophon (*Artaxerxes* 8.7). He claims that Cyrus, knowing what was best, ordered Clearchus to attack the center, but Clearchus, having told Cyrus that he would see to it that the best was done, in turn refused and thus ruined everything. His statement is interesting in showing the different opinions that ancient authors held. Xenophon does not blame Clearchus in any way and seems to be impartial about the whole event. The reason why he does this is uncertain. Perhaps he may have realized Cyrus' blunder, yet out of admiration for him felt that he should not comment on the subject. It is also likely that Xenophon could not have witnessed the whole battle, and thus did not have personal knowledge of the discussion between Cyrus and Clearchus. Perhaps then Xenophon felt that he did not know enough about the situation to comment in detail about it.

and confusion on Cyrus' side would almost certainly have caused a greater loss for him. Obviously there were factors such as the greater size of the king's army, as well as Cyrus' late arrival, that made the situation even more difficult for Cyrus. However, the evidence seems to suggest that Cyrus, who had never actually led an army before, did not have enough knowledge about strategy and tactics and thus did make an error in these matters. After all the praise that Xenophon does bestow upon Cyrus, among all of his eulogies of him, Xenophon never commends Cyrus for good military judgment.[60]

The result of the battle, quite simply, was that the Greeks found themselves in the heart of Persia without any friends, allies, or employer. Over the course of the next few days, the Greeks had dealings with Ariaeus and Tissaphernes, and they eventually made a truce with the latter. Tissaphernes promised to give the Greeks safe passage home and opportunities to procure provisions along the way. In return, the Greeks would march as though they were in a friendly country and do no harm to the surrounding lands (2.3.16). It seems that the Greeks accepted the truce as the only viable option; they were 2500 kilometers from Sardis and not knowing anything about the surrounding geography they had no alternative but to embrace the proposal of Tissaphernes.[61] Tissaphernes then led the Greeks to the Greater Zab where he informed Clearchus that certain individuals were spreading slander about and trying to make enemies of the Greeks and Persians. He then offered to Clearchus to reveal to him the names of these traitors, on the condition that Clearchus as well as all the other Greek generals come to his tent the following day. Clearchus agreed to bring the other four generals to Tissaphernes, perhaps hoping to believe that Tissaphernes was speaking truthfully. Clearchus suspected Menon of spreading the reported slander, and so wished to condemn him in front of the other generals (2.5.28). We cannot forget that there likely remained a dislike and distrust between Clearchus and Menon from the incident in the Arabian desert (1.5). It is also possible, as Xenophon explains (2.5.29), that his motives for bringing the generals to Tissaphernes were based on a

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[60] Hewitt (1918-19) 247.
[61] J.B. Bury and Russell Meiggs, *A History of Greece* 4 (London 1975) 329.

desire to have the supreme command and loyalty of the whole army to himself. If we consider these points, it is conceivable that Clearchus' desire to convict Menon and remove him from the army may have blinded his better judgment.[62]

Once inside the tent of Tissaphernes, the Greek generals were seized and word was brought back to the other Greeks that Clearchus had been killed and the other four generals, Proxenus, Menon, Agias and Socrates, had all been arrested. In actuality all the generals were taken alive to Babylon where they were later executed. The result of the execution of the generals is obvious: the Greeks were deprived of their former generals and, knowing that they could not trust the Persians at all, had to appoint new leaders and try to return home themselves.[63] Whatever the situation concerning the execution of the generals may have been, the Greeks found themselves in an even greater predicament. They had lost their original generals and Tissaphernes, by virtue of his breaking the truce, had openly declared the Greeks to be enemies. That night, as Xenophon writes (3.1.3), few, if any of the soldiers slept, tortured by the thought of the impossible situation that they were in. According to Xenophon, they were lacking in cavalry, provisions, and most of all a knowledge and means of getting home. That night was a turning point in the history of the Ten Thousand, for Xenophon had his famous dream which instilled in him a vision to lead the Greek mercenaries through the Persian Empire back to their homeland (3.1.11-15).

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[62] Ibid. 329. The ancient sources differ somewhat on this point. Diodorus (14.26.4-6) does not mention that Tissaphernes told Clearchus that he would provide him with the names of traitors, as opposed to Xenophon, who claims that Tissaphernes did say this (2.5.25). Xenophon also claims that Clearchus was adamant about going even though he was initially opposed by his men (2.5.22). In contrast, Ctesias, *F Gr Hist* 688 F 27, states that Clearchus went against his will, forced by the numerous Greeks. His account can probably be traced to his admiration of Clearchus (Bigwood 345); Ctesias did not wish to hold Clearchus solely responsible for causing the deaths of the five Greek generals.

[63] The situation surrounding the execution of the generals is not very clear. It seems unlikely that the Greeks would accuse one another in hopes of procuring favors from the Persians considering the situation that they were in. However, Menon and Clearchus were not on the best of terms and both Xenophon (2.5.15) and Diodorus (14.27.2) claim that it was thought that Menon might betray the Greeks. If this is the case then it is possible that Clearchus figured that if he accused Menon before Menon accused him, then he would be better off. Another interesting point to consider is the claim that Menon had inherited from his father a connection with the Persian king, and so he survived longer than the other generals. George Cawkwell, Introduction and Notes to *Xenophon The Persian Expedition*. Trans. Rex Warner. (London 1972) 135 n. 12. If Cawkwell's claim is correct, then it appears more probable that Menon may have thought that by deceiving his fellow Greeks he would save his own life.

Until the night of the execution of the generals, Xenophon's role in the march had been relatively uneventful. His position as neither general, captain, nor soldier (3.1.4), enabled him to observe the happenings and dealings of the generals and soldiers from an outsider's perspective. The numerous days of marching had certainly given Xenophon plenty of time to form opinions and ideas about the army as a whole and about certain individuals within the army. For this reason, when the Greek generals were killed, Xenophon must have been as distraught as the rest of the army. However, his position in the army enabled him to be better acquainted than others with all aspects of the army, whether they were soldiers or generals. The reason for this was that Xenophon, through association with the soldiers, was able to see things from their perspective, and his ties to Proxenus allowed him to understand the focus and intent of the generals. These things, combined with Xenophon's previous military experience, in turn made him the best suited to lead the army.[64] The months of traveling had in essence been a type of orientation for Xenophon, which prepared him to undertake the task of leading the Greeks home. Although Xenophon's previous experiences in life, such as his cavalry duties, were not requirements for his leadership, they did instill in Xenophon the confidence and know-how of leading his fellow Greeks back home.

[64] Xenophon was perhaps one of the few who was able to see the situation at Cunaxa from both sides, Cyrus' strategy and tactics, as well as Clearchus' leadership and organization.

II

ELEMENTS OF XENOPHON'S LEADERSHIP

Though the execution of the Greek generals deprived the Ten Thousand of their leaders, it also allowed Xenophon to take up a direct role in the army and to lead the army back home. Interestingly, Nussbaum suggests that the death of Clearchus was actually a blessing in disguise for the community, for otherwise there may not have been a return of the Ten Thousand, and thus no *Anabasis* dominated by Xenophon.[1] Nussbaum's claim shows his opinion that Xenophon's leadership was better for the army than was Clearchus'. The only reason that Xenophon took matters into his own hands and vowed to lead the Greeks home safely was that he realized that unless there was immediate action, then the Greeks would most likely be slaughtered by the Persians or else captured and treated like slaves. From the moment that Xenophon took the initiative and summoned the remaining leaders until the period when he left the army in Pergamon, he acted as leader of the Ten Thousand and was largely responsible for their safe return to Ionia. During this time Xenophon displayed many elements of his leadership, both in times of peace and in times of conflict. Through a close reading of the *Anabasis* we can observe more closely Xenophon's leadership and focus on the different elements of it.

One important element of Xenophon's leadership was his piety and his reverence towards the gods. From the moment that he was visited with his vision from Zeus, Xenophon sacrificed numerous times and constantly repeated his belief that it was the will of the gods for the Greeks to return home safely. Xenophon's first major speech after the execution of the generals was a very important one in which he set out his ideas and visions to the various captains. In this speech Xenophon did not mention the dream that he had; however, he did state his fervent belief that the gods, who would be the ultimate judges of this contest, would be on the side of the Greeks, because the enemy took the names of the gods in vain and offended them by perjury (3.1.21-22). As Hirsch points out, Xenophon's belief was that the gods would help

[1] Nussbaum 139.

them and would punish the Persians as perjurers and oath-breakers.[2] Xenophon's statement thus presented the powerful Persians as being cursed by the gods. Xenophon surely realized that the Persians were superior in number of troops, knowledge of the surrounding geography, and tactics on such ground, and so he needed to present them to his fellow Greeks as being inferior. The one way that he felt that he could accomplish this was to present them as being impious.[3] Xenophon's tactic obviously worked, as the army gained courage and confidence and voted to elect him as leader, realizing that it was possible for them to reach the Black Sea. Quite simply, through piety Xenophon instilled new morale, hope and courage in his men. By claiming that the gods were on the side of the Greeks, Xenophon caused the majority of the soldiers to believe that it was in their destiny to be successful and prosperous. The effect of Xenophon's speech on the soldiers can be seen in an event that took place amidst another of his speeches (3.2.9). While Xenophon was extolling the favor of the gods upon the Greeks someone sneezed, and he proclaimed this to be an omen from Zeus the Savior. The response from the soldiers was overwhelming: they all agreed to sacrifice and to give thank-offerings to the gods, and afterwards they all sang the paean. It is thus evident that Xenophon's piety enabled him to believe that the gods were on the side of the Greeks, and in turn to convince the army of this. He thus inspired the Greeks with courage and suggested the measures which had to be taken for the march.[4] Once these measures were understood and accepted by the army, the Ten Thousand began their march northwards full of courage and bravery, believing that their success was the will of the gods.

Xenophon's claim that the gods were on the side of the Greeks was used again after the first attack by the Persians. After Mithridates and his men attacked the Greeks with slings and arrows (3.3), the Greeks were quite alarmed and surprised.

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[2] Steven W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians* (Hanover and London 1985) 30.

[3] The statement that the gods were on the side of the Greeks can also be seen as a military tactic on the part of Xenophon, for all the Greeks knew that victory was more likely if the favour of a deity could be ensured. A.J. Holladay and M.D. Goodman, 'Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare', *CQ* 36 1980 152.

[4] Maurice W. Mather and Joseph William Hewitt, *Xenophon's Anabasis Books I -IV.* (Norman 1962) 20.

According to Hirsch, some of the Greeks may have wished to surrender to the Persians or to have attempted further negotiations rather than to undertake the seemingly impossible retreat.[5] A primary reason for this doubt is that the Greeks did not have either slingers or cavalry, both of which were necessary to drive back the Persians. Xenophon, who also was disturbed by the attack and accepted the blame that the soldiers put on him (3.3.12), realized that he could not allow the Greeks to lose courage and faith. As a result he stated that they were to be grateful that the gods allowed only a small force of Persians to attack them, and thus to show them where improvements had to be made (3.3.14). This again shows Xenophon presenting an unfavorable situation to the army in a positive light through the use of piety.[6]

The use of sacrifices by Xenophon during the retreat is another significant matter in the study of Xenophon's piety. Quite simply, the purpose of his sacrificial rites was to obtain favourable signs from the gods.[7] After the initial attack by Mithridates, the Greeks were pursued by the Persians as they made their way north to the territory of the Carduchi. Xenophon realized the difficult task ahead of them and thus held sacrifices in order to bless their attempt at successfully crossing the mountains. Since Xenophon states that a Persian army of 120,000 had previously been wiped out in the land of the Carduchi (3.5.16) it is evident that he felt that the Greeks needed all the help that they could get, and so he appealed to the gods to help them. The successful crossing into Armenia must have surely reinforced Xenophon's belief that the gods were helping the Greeks. This might explain why Xenophon took the dream that he had a few days later (4.3.8) to be a very good omen. The dream was then followed by another sacrifice in the morning which turned out favorably.[8]

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[5] Hirsch (31) also points out that Xenophon and some of the others wanted to fight for their freedom, and thus their speeches were made to convince the army, especially those who had lost hope, of the correctness of that policy.

[6] These episodes also provide glimpses of how Xenophon used different ideas to motivate the army. More will be seen on this matter in the study of his discipline and overall leadership

[7] Michael H. Jameson, 'Sacrifice Before Battle', *Hoplites.* Victor Davis Hanson (ed) (London and New York 1991) 198.

[8] As W. Kendrick Pritchett points out in *The Greek State at War* Vol 1 (Berkeley 1971) 110, to take omens and to find them unfavorable was merely inviting trouble. Though Xenophon did not invent favorable omens, he may have been tempted to take ambiguous omens as being propitious, which explains why almost all of Xenophon's sacrifices turned out favorably.

The combination of the dream and the favorable auspices must have instilled Xenophon with greater courage and hope, which in turn he would have passed on to his men.[9]

Xenophon's use of sacrificing seems to have become more common in accordance with the favourable fortunes of the army. This is seen in 4.3.13, when Xenophon made a libation after two of his men informed him of a way to cross the river. Xenophon immediately thanked the gods who had pointed out the ford to his men and so took this to be yet another act of goodwill on the part of the gods. This episode shows the extent of Xenophon's piety, in that he was beginning to treat any favorable outcome, or anything that seemed promising, to be a message from the gods.[10] What is clear is that Xenophon now fervently believed that the gods really were on the side of the Greeks, and that it was their destiny to reach home safely. Xenophon felt that his sacrifices would result in the ideal outcome of a collaboration of gods and men at every step.[11] The belief and trust in the gods was taken even farther in Armenia when a sacrifice to the wind was carried out, so as to diminish the wind and snow (4.5.4). The result was that everyone agreed that there was a distinct falling off in the force of the wind. Perhaps this is true; however, it seems likely that the soldiers perceived the wind to have let up, because they desperately wanted this. Since previous sacrifices had all worked out favorably, Xenophon and the Greeks were expecting this one to also work out. It seems as if they could not accept an unfavorable omen, as that would have created some doubt in the minds of the soldiers as to whether they were preferred by the gods. It thus appears that the Greeks, and perhaps most of all Xenophon, had convinced themselves that they were supported by the gods, and so in turn any omen was read favorably, because it was believed that it should be approbatory.

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[9] It seems safe to say that Xenophon was diplomatic enough to know when to tell the army certain things and when to withhold particular information from them. For instance, Xenophon's knowledge about an army of 120,000 Persians not returning from the land of the Carduchi (3.5.16) was almost certainly withheld from the army, so as not to lessen morale.

[10] This is not to say that Xenophon used piety simply as a tactical tool. Though Xenophon did use piety to compel his men, we must remember that Xenophon was extremely pious and reverent and that he truly believed what he stated.

[11] Jameson 220.

Further sacrifices were given in Armenia (4.5.35) and in the land of the Chalybes (4.6.27) in honor of the successes that the gods had granted unto the Greeks. There was nothing spectacular about the circumstances surrounding these sacrifices; they merely seemed to be regular sacrifices giving thanks, as was the custom of the Greek people. As Jameson points out, after a victory the winning side set up a trophy and performed victory sacrifices, to which sometimes were added athletic contests.[12] However, since the Ten Thousand were involved in one hardship after another, we can look at the retreat as being different from simply a number of successive battles. In the case of a few separate battles, each battle would be different and thus each sacrifice would be independent of a former one. In this case though, since each separate battle was part of a larger undertaking, it seems that the Greeks viewed each new problem as being related to a previous one. That is to say, they may have felt that since they were successful in previous skirmishes and attacks, they should be successful in future ones, as they all formed part of a larger, unified campaign. This would suggest that the Greeks treated these two sacrifices as routine ones, in which they were supposed to be victorious, as opposed to ones where the outcomes would determine the next actions of the army; after all, despite what the omens may have been, where were the Greeks to go other than north to the sea?

The sacrifices at Trapezus were different from the previous sacrifices, in that they represented a partial culmination of the journey (4.8.25). Having reached the sea, the Greeks felt much safer than before and began to see the likelihood of returning home safely. The sacrifices that were made were quite large and were important, in that they represented the sacrifices that the Greeks had vowed to make at the beginning of their retreat (3.2.9). For this reason they appear to be more genuine than some of the previous sacrifices. Whereas prior sacrifices seem to have been made as routine ones, the ones at Trapezus show the Greeks being genuinely grateful for the help of the gods in directing them homewards to the sea. After Trapezus, on the way back to the Hellespont, Xenophon again made sacrifices to the gods a number of times. What is interesting is that a number of these sacrifices turned out unfavorably,

[12] Ibid. 198.

such as the election of Xenophon to be commander-in-chief (6.1.24), and the decision to leave Calpe (6.4.17). Due to the unfavorable omens, both of these plans were rejected. It seems that they were rejected because they could afford to be. Whereas previously the Greeks had no choice but to march on and engage the enemy, they now did have options: Xenophon did not have to be the main commander, and the Greeks did not have to leave Calpe at once. What this shows is that on the retreat the Greeks, thinking that it was their destiny to be successful, believed that every omen should be favorable and thus regarded each one as being so. However, after they had reached Trapezus which supposedly had been destined for them, they began to regard the omens more seriously. No longer were they guaranteed of succeeding; rather they were in the same situation as numerous other Greeks had been at previous times. Since they had options open to them they were in turn more hesitant to see every omen as being favorable, and thus when an omen was not completely favorable, they took the usual precautions and abandoned a certain plan.

The sacrifices at Calpe are instrumental in showing how cautious Xenophon was concerning sacrifices and how much importance he gave to favourable omens. As Xenophon describes (6.4.13-26) the army sacrificed eight times to see whether they should leave, and each time the omens were unfavourable. As a result, Xenophon kept insisting that they could not leave until the omens were favourable. Neon of Asine, who had been appointed commander-in-chief after Chirisophus's death, then decided to ignore the bad omens and sent out two thousand Greeks on a raiding mission who were promptly attacked by Pharnabazus' cavalry (6.4.23-25). A quarter of these men were killed and the rest fled to the mountains. Neon's actions show the consequences of not heeding the results of sacrifices. They also show how judicious Xenophon was in refusing to leave until the sacrifices were favorable. For Xenophon it was quite clear that an action should not be undertaken until the gods had advised it. The success of Xenophon's thinking is seen, when the next day the sacrifices were favourable (6.5.2), and the Greeks set out; later that day they were victorious over the forces of Spithridates and Rhathines.

When Xenophon finally arrived at Lampsacus, he made another great sacrifice, as the dangers of the journey finally seemed to be over (7.8.4). As Xenophon himself states, this sacrifice to Zeus of Propitiation was the first sacrifice that he had made to this deity since he had left home (7.8.4). Perhaps then it was made out of a feeling of neglect of not having sacrificed to Zeus during the expedition. It does show Xenophon's genuine piety, though, as he fulfilled his promises and gave thanks to the gods that returned him safely to Greece. It also may show that Diogenes' epigram of Xenophon was proven correct (Diogenes Laertius 2.58).

> οὐ μόνον εἰς Περσας ἀνέβη Ξενοφῶν διὰ Κῦρον,
> ἀλλ' ἄνοδον ζητῶν ἐς Διὸς ἥτις ἄγοι.
> Not only for Cyrus' sake did Xenophon march towards
> the Persians, but in search of a road which led to Zeus.

Xenophon's piety thus obviously helped the Greeks in returning home, as it provided them with a source of inspiration and hope. However, other elements of his leadership were also crucial in helping the Greeks return home safely, one of these being the strategy and tactics devised and employed by Xenophon both in marching and in battle. Immediately after he was elected as one of the leaders, Xenophon explained his strategy for marching, stating that it was necessary to set fire to the wagons and to carry only essentials on the march (3.2.27-28).[13] He then suggested that the army march in a hollow square formation in times of danger so as to protect the baggage and general crowds inside the square (3.2.36). Xenophon's proposals suggest that he was anticipating future attacks by the enemy and so he felt the need to provide some definite organization for the Greeks. This is shown in his plans to determine who should be in the front and rear of the square, and who should be on the two flanks. As Xenophon stated, it was much more beneficial to have all this planned out before the enemy was approaching, rather than to attempt to organize in the face of the enemy (3.2.36). This statement shows that the importance of order in battle was quite a significant matter for Xenophon.

[13] This statement on the part of Xenophon indicates his belief in the importance of tactics; this is also clear from the care with which he records the formations adopted in particular actions. Anderson (1970) 96.

A few examples from the *Hellenica* show that if Xenophon mentions disorder before a battle, that side eventually loses. In the battle of Notium (*Hell.* 1.5), Xenophon claims that the Spartans were in good order while the Athenians were in no sort of order at all (1.5.14). He then immediately states that the Athenians lost fifteen triremes. It is quite clear that Xenophon felt that the Athenian loss of their triremes was dependent upon the disorder of their navy. Another example can be seen in the battle of Aegospotami (*Hell.* 2.1) in which the disorder of the Athenian fleet enabled the Spartans to defeat them quite easily. Xenophon seems to make a point of mentioning that the Athenian ships were scattered over the ocean in a disorderly fashion (2.1.27-28), before they were captured by the Spartan fleet. Disorder can also be seen in the battle of Coronea (*Hell.* 4.3), where Agesilaus managed to attack the Thessalians while they were in the midst of turning their forces around. The result was that they were caught unexpectedly and suffered some losses (*Hell.* 4.3.7-9). Xenophon also describes how Iphicrates was victorious because he attacked Anaxibius' troops while they were stretched out in a long line and virtually helpless (*Hell.* 4.8.37). Xenophon's accounts of these battles suggests that Xenophon did consider battle order to be very important. In the *Anabasis* we can see the results of disorder in the battle of Cunaxa (1.8). Xenophon makes a point in mentioning that the king's army was approaching in battle order while the army of Cyrus had to take up its correct positions (1.8.1-4). Again we see how defeat of one army follows the mention of disorder of battle formation of that army. Perhaps the disaster at Cunaxa made Xenophon further realize how important battle order was, and thus why he stressed it from the very beginning.

The first attack by Mithridates at the Zapatas river made Xenophon realize that infantry could not compete fairly with cavalry, and that it was necessary to obtain cavalry and slingers to defend the Greeks from the Persians. As Paul Rahe points out, a hoplite army unsupported by a strong cavalry force would have been helpless in much of Asia.[14] Hoplites were not able to withstand the attacks from enemy peltasts for too long, and they were unable to charge after the enemy. Even a few cavalry

[14] Paul A Rahe, 'The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa', *AJPh* 101 (1980) 84.

could overtake and cut down fleeing light infantry,[15] thereby protecting the hoplites. It is to the credit of Xenophon and his fellow commanders that they managed to improvise a remedy to this situation,[16] by obtaining the necessary cavalry and slingers.[17] Xenophon's plan was soon put to use, for the following day Tissaphernes attacked the Greeks while they were crossing a river and the Greeks managed successfully to defend themselves with their cavalry (3.4.4). A number of days later, while Tissaphernes was still in pursuit, the Greeks made use of their Rhodian slingers and realized that they were able to sling farther than the Persian slingers, and even farther than most of the Persian archers (3.4.16). These two episodes then not only gave more confidence to Xenophon himself, but also probably elevated his military tactics in the eyes of his men. Since Xenophon was able to correct the Greek defects before they had suffered serious losses, he was able to introduce two new elements, slingers and cavalry, into the Greek army which in turn took away the advantage from the Persians and made the terms more equal between the two armies.

The adoption of the hollow square formation was quite useful in most instances, though the Greeks soon realized that the square was a bad formation to use when the enemy was in the rear (3.4.19). The result was that a mobile force of 600 troops was created that could make room when needed, fill up spaces when necessary, and was always ready for action if the main body was attacked.[18] The creation of this new force shows that the Greek generals were quite capable of using their skill and knowledge to work around certain situations or problems related to the military. An

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[15] Anderson (1970) 117.

[16] Parke 24.

[17] Agesilaus also came to realize that cavalry was indispensable if one was to prove victorious over the Persians (*Hell.* 3.4.15).

[18] It is quite likely that Xenophon did not have much input into the creation of this new force. If he had, then he certainly would have attributed the idea to himself. The fact that he does not might help in proving that the *Anabasis* is not simply his idiosyncratic vision of the march, in which he glorifies himself, a self-panegyric of Xenophon. Cf. Higgins 95, and J.P. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History* (New York 1892;1976) 107. Rather, as Anderson (1974) 129 states, he most likely did not lie in order to magnify his own achievements, but instead wrote frankly as an eyewitness. Dalby suggests that Xenophon did not intentionally falsify the actions or motives of anyone other than himself, and thus clarifies Xenophon's possible errors by suggesting that he probably misinterpreted or misunderstood certain events. Andrew Dalby, 'Greeks Abroad: Social Organisation and Food Among the Ten Thousand', *JHS* 112 (1992) 18.

excellent example of this is seen in the attack by Mithridates upon the Greeks (6.5.7-32). As soon as he saw the large enemy force, Xenophon proposed that a body of reserves should be employed to assist the army in case there was a break in the cohesion of the line. This tactic was quite interesting and original as the use of reserves in hoplite warfare was very rare in the fifth century.[19] Another example of the Greeks' devising new tactics in relation to certain problems can be seen in their realization that a Persian army was useless at night (3.4.35), which resulted in the army's decision to march farther once night had fallen in order to create a greater distance between the two armies. As a result, the Greeks did not see the Persians for the next few days. Shortly after, the Greeks encountered another problem which in turn forced Xenophon to devise new strategies or tactics in order to defeat the enemy. While the Greeks were marching through the mountains, the natives had occupied a height in the mountains that was overlooking the intended route of the Greeks (3.4.37). Xenophon quickly realized that the army could not pass without dislodging the enemy, and so devised a plan to rid the enemy of their position (3.4.41). The plan was quite simple: to reach the summit above the enemy and thus to force the enemy away from the position that they held. Xenophon's plan worked and in turn allowed the Greeks to continue their march. Having conquered one summit through his planning, Xenophon then formed another plan to conquer a number of successive hills (4.2.13). Xenophon again understood the potential problems before he encountered them, and thus was able to devise methods around them without suffering great losses. His tactics in the mountains thus showed an ability to think quickly and to adopt new ideas and strategies by using previous knowledge and adapting it to present situations. As a result of Xenophon's quick thinking and organization, the Greeks managed to pass through the mountains in the territory of the Carduchi relatively unscathed, and to continue on to the Centrites river.

The crossing of the Centrites river (4.3.20-32) once again showed the ability of Xenophon and the other generals to devise quickly new tactics to deceive and defeat the enemy. It also showed that the Greeks were able to think under pressure when

[19] Cawkwell (1972) 285 n. 9.

their original plan did not work exactly as intended. The Greeks must be given credit for adopting the plan to rush the enemy from the river, while the enemy was attacking them.[20] If not for the quick thinking of the Greek generals, it is quite likely that the Greek army might have suffered heavy casualties while attempting to cross the river. The territory after the Centrites river presented the Greeks with more mountain ranges to cross in the land of the Chalybes. During this part of the march they came up to a pass that was held by Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasians (4.6.5). Cleanor, one of the Greek generals, suggested that the Greeks attack the pass immediately after lunch. Xenophon, who by now had acquired considerable skill in capturing mountain passes, proposed to feign an attack and then to advance stealthily at nighttime and thus to reach the summit above the enemy. We can see that this strategy was quite similar to his previous strategy to gain the height above the enemy and so to have the upper hand. We should not, however, assume that Xenophon had only one strategy for occupying mountain passes. The strategy used in the occupation of the Colchian mountains showed Xenophon's ability to adapt his knowledge (4.8.9-15). He abandoned the traditional system of marching in a line and proposed to march in a number of columns so that each column could march at its own pace. Xenophon by now knew firsthand that mountain terrain was not uniform and thus some of the troops would be forced to march more slowly. The adoption of a new strategy showed the inventiveness of Xenophon; against such an enemy as the Colchians, the small, deep columns with intervals were the best-suited tactical formation.[21] Once again Xenophon's plan was successful and caused the enemy to retreat from their position As a result of having gained this last pass, the Greeks were able to march to Trapezus, the first Greek city that they had encountered in a long time.

Once the Greeks had reached Trapezus, they had fewer problems and difficulties than they had suffered on their march from Cunaxa. Although they no

[20] The strategy of tricking the enemy into thinking that the Greeks were intending to do one thing while they were actually planning to do another can also be seen in the attack upon the Taochi (4.7.7), in which Xenophon forced the enemy to exhaust their missiles by making it appear as if the Greeks were intent on rushing the fortress. Once the enemy had used nearly all of their artillery, the Greeks then invaded the fortress.

[21] Delbrück 151.

longer faced the dangers of being attacked by natives as much as before, they still worried about obtaining provisions, maintaining unity, and deciding upon the best way to return home. While the army waited at Trapezus until Chirisophus returned with some ships (5.1), Xenophon offered tactical solutions to preserve the cohesion, unity and safety of the army. The suggestions he proposed were to forage for provisions in regular detachments, keep informed of any movements of the soldiers, and to set up guards around their camp (5.1.6-10). These safety measures show Xenophon's constant concern for the well-being of the army. Whereas another general may have allowed the soldiers to act freely thinking that Trapezus was a safe location, Xenophon realized that there still were significant dangers and so tried to maintain the same unity in the army that he had professed earlier during the retreat. The idea of the unity of the army was again stressed by Xenophon at Sinope (5.6.12-13), when he stated that the army must stick together, even if this meant that they would have to travel by land instead of by sea. These examples show Xenophon's belief that the unity and cohesion of the army was one of its most important elements, for it did not matter how skillful the army was if its divisions were always separate from one another. Xenophon reiterates this point later (7.3.37-38), by describing to Seuthes the Greek marching strategy in daytime as opposed to nighttime. Upon hearing this Seuthes realized the benefits of Xenophon's strategy and agreed to follow his practice. His acceptance of this plan indicates that he must have considered Xenophon's strategy worthy, and it in turn raises the credibility of Xenophon's military strategy.

Though Xenophon stressed the importance of unity of the army, the Greeks eventually split up into three divisions (6.2). One of the divisions, which consisted of the Arcadians, soon found itself at Calpe surrounded by Thracians, after a failed plundering expedition. Upon realizing this, Xenophon devised some tactics to rescue his fellow Greeks, which consisted of tricking the Thracians into thinking that Xenophon's army was going to attack at night. As a result the Thracians retreated and this allowed the Arcadians to join up with Xenophon. The strategy used here was nothing new to Xenophon. The use of trickery, as in appearing to attack while not intending to, was also used by Xenophon and the Greeks at the Centrites river

(4.3.20ff), the attack upon the Taochi (4.7.7), as well as the attack on the Drilae (5.2.3-27), in which the Greeks, while retreating from a failed plundering expedition realized that they could not retreat safely, and so launched what appeared to be an offensive attack and by doing so created an escape for themselves.

These examples show some of the strategy and tactics used by Xenophon and the Greeks in their journey back home. Though some of the plans and tactics appear to have been simple common sense, Xenophon should be given credit for a number of his proposals, such as his plans for crossing the mountains, and his constant efforts to keep the army unified and in one piece. It is difficult to say whether these ideas would have been adopted by another general if Xenophon had not been present; however, his presence was responsible for many of these tactics and ideas.[22] The study of Xenophon's military strategy, along with the study of his piety, also gives a background and some insight into his means and methods of discipline. Certain things are clearly evident, such as his acceptance of others' ideas, his concern for the whole army, and his concern for order and unity. There were, however, other elements to Xenophon's form of leadership which became clear in times of hardships and incertitude. By studying Xenophon's use and manner of discipline throughout the march, we can gain a better understanding of the type of leader that he was, and eventually see how successful this type of leadership was.

When Xenophon was elected as one of the leaders of the Ten Thousand, he knew that the army had to begin its retreat very shortly; however, he took care not to force his men into this decision (3.2.10-33). Xenophon instead adopted the approach of instilling his men with confidence and downplaying all the future hardships. Though the Greeks had no cavalry, which was crucial in the terrain of Persia, Xenophon claimed that the Greeks were better off and that the only advantage that the Persians had with their cavalry was that they would be able to escape from the Greeks more

[22] The manner in which Xenophon presents some of his ideas on tactical formations (4.8.9-19), seems to indicate that he felt that previous Greek tactics were insufficient and unsuitable (*Memorabilia* 3.1.2-4). Whether or not Xenophon's feelings were justified, it should not be doubted that from the first he showed superior professional skill in tactics and handling men in formation. Anderson (1970) 129.

quickly (3.2.19). He then went on to state that he was mainly worried that the Greeks would grow accustomed to the ease of life in the Persian lands, and never reach home (3.2.25). These statements by Xenophon indicate extreme positive reinforcement on his part. Quite simply, Xenophon instilled such confidence in his men, backing it up with auspices, that they were eager to undertake the arduous journey home. This way, even if a few soldiers were reluctant to march, they knew that the majority of the army was confident and hopeful and thus they most likely went along with the masses fearful of being branded as cowards or deserters. Xenophon used the same tactics of filling his men with hope and courage during the march when he felt that the troops were becoming hesitant to continue or even doubtful of their success. When Tissaphernes began to burn the villages around the Greeks, a number of the soldiers became very downhearted about this thinking that they would be unable to procure supplies or provisions (3.5.3). Seeing this, Xenophon told the soldiers that by burning the land Tissaphernes was acknowledging that the land belonged to the Greeks (3.5.5). This statement in turn made the Greeks realize that the Persians were indeed wary and fearful of the Greeks, and it thus made the Greeks more self-confident. We see this tactic used again in the attack against the Colchians (4.8.14), before which Xenophon stated that the Greeks could not let the Colchians prevent them from reaching Trapezus, the city which they had been so eager to reach for such a long time.[23]

Perhaps one of the ways in which Xenophon instilled the greatest confidence in his men was in his statement that by killing the Greek generals, the Persians in effect created 10,000 generals out of 10,000 soldiers (3.2.31). This statement made each soldier feel as if he were more than only a soldier, but instead an important link in the chain that constituted the army of the Ten Thousand. By making this statement Xenophon ensured that each soldier shared in the responsibilities, duties, and benefits of the army unit as if it were a political body.[24] As a result of this, not only did each

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[23] As Rev. J.S. Watson points out in *Xenophon's Anabasis* (London 1912) 141, Xenophon uses the word καταφᾶγεῖν, which literally means 'to eat up raw' but metaphorically can mean 'to extirpate utterly and at once'. If we accept Watson's point, then Xenophon's statement to his soldiers must have instilled in them an almost savage desire to annihilate the enemy, another case in which he filled his men with courage, optimism and confidence before an attack.

[24] Robert J. Bonner, 'The Organization of the Ten Thousand', *CJ* 7 (1911-12) 360.

soldier feel that he had greater responsibilities, but he also felt that each should have the same input. The reason for this was that Xenophon stressed that all men in the army were equal and that the opinions of all mattered greatly. This is not to say though that Xenophon downplayed the importance of captains, officers, and generals. As he points out in 3.1.37, he expected them to be braver than the soldiers and to set an example for them. His statement was meant mainly for the soldiers, so that they would feel as if they were important to the army in terms of decision making and planning. By making such a statement, Xenophon made each soldier feel as if he was an integral part of the army, which Xenophon believed they were and thus treated them as such. Xenophon also displayed the equality of his men by allowing the soldiers to call to account the deeds of the generals, and more than once after they left Trapezus even Xenophon was obliged to defend himself against bitter accusations.[25] Xenophon's belief in equality was an important part of his leadership, and was present and evident all throughout the march, as he showed many instances in which he emphasized the importance of fairness and equality of the army as a unit. This can be seen in 3.2, when upon finishing his speech Xenophon asked whether anyone, soldier or officer, had any better suggestions to propose concerning the order of the march (3.2.38).[26] By allowing the soldiers to voice their opinions, Xenophon partially removed the burden from himself if anything were to go wrong, considering that everyone had agreed and had had the choice to state their disapproval. Xenophon's openness and acceptance of all the soldiers was also made evident in his treatment of two soldiers at the river Centrites (4.3.10). The youths felt free to approach Xenophon at any time, since they knew how important everyone's opinion was to him. As a result of his openness and accessibility, Xenophon was able to lead the army across the river the following day by using the information that his soldiers had given him. It is safe to say that if Xenophon had kept apart from the soldiers and had treated them as subordinates, then he very well may not have been able to cross the river with

[25] Mather and Hewitt 47.

[26] Though Xenophon encouraged everyone to provide input and state their opinions, we should not assume that there was no hierarchy in the Ten Thousand. The Ten Thousand inherited, renewed and maintained a well-defined hierarchy: generals, officers and men. Dalby 22.

such minimal casualties. It is thus obvious that there was a definite sense of equality among the men in the Greek army, and that each considered himself an important part of a larger unit. It was not only the soldiers who regarded themselves as being as worthy as their superiors, but also the captains, lieutenants, and other officers who considered themselves just as good men as the generals (5.2.13).

It is important to note that Xenophon did not merely express verbally the equality of all, but he also demonstrated it in his actions. During the army's attempt to gain a height before the army of Tissaphernes, Xenophon exemplified what he had said about the army being equal, by showing that he too was required to do the same amount of work as the regular soldiers. While racing up the hill, Soteridas, one of the soldiers, accused Xenophon of unfairly urging on the soldiers while he was riding on horseback (3.4.47). Without replying Xenophon jumped off his horse and took the place of Soteridas amidst the ranks, to which the other soldiers responded by shouting down Soteridas and throwing stones at him. It seems that Soteridas' attack not only offended Xenophon personally, but it also made Xenophon realize that he had to act quickly so as not to lose the support of the soldiers. Even if one argues that Xenophon did see himself as better than an ordinary soldier, it must be acknowledged that his tactic of dismounting and assuming the place of Soteridas turned the soldiers against Soteridas and elevated Xenophon in the eyes of the soldiers.[27] Xenophon used this practice of setting an example for the rest of the soldiers again in the snows of Armenia (4.4.12). This act of selflessness and willpower on the part of Xenophon very well may have saved much of the army from freezing to death in the Armenian blizzard. It is obvious that Xenophon had the same lack of desire as everyone else to rise from the snow and to begin chopping wood, but the reasons that he did so include

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[27] If perhaps Xenophon really did think of himself as being much worthier than the soldiers, then something certainly has to be said for his leadership skills, for Xenophon managed to convince the soldiers that he treated them all as equals. It seems more likely though, that this was Xenophon's true nature, and that he did actually consider the trust and love of the soldiers as being very important to him. As well, Xenophon most likely believed that it was the duty of the leader to give twice as much effort as the soldiers, and thus to set an example for them. Cf. Xenophon's comments on the leadership of Teleutias and Jason in the *Hellenica* (5.1.4,14-18, 6.1.5-15). Both of these individuals had gained the love and trust of their men by treating them with respect and fairness, placing the interests of the soldiers ahead of their own, and setting examples for their men through their actions.

the fact that he was one of the leaders and thus he felt that it was his duty to motivate his men. As well though, Xenophon seems to have honestly cared about the army and treated them more than as just hired soldiers. His concerns for the army are also evident through some of his actions during the march.

When Xenophon found a number of his men suffering from illness during the march through the snow in Armenia, he immediately organized men to obtain food for the sick, and at the same time he himself went through the baggage train and attempted to find food (4.5.8). Again he may have done this simply because he felt that it was his duty as a leader; however, considering the extreme conditions that the Greeks were in, it is likely that another general such as Menon, who supposedly felt no affection for anyone (2.6.23), would not have thought twice about leaving the ailing soldiers behind. Xenophon again showed his concern for the army when the soldiers refused to march any farther (4.5.15-19) and sat down in the snow. At first Xenophon used incentives, then compulsion, and when he realized that the army was stubborn because of cold and physical incapacity, he looked after them well and attempted to scare the enemy so that they would not attack the helpless Greeks.[28] What is interesting is that Xenophon did not attempt to force his men to keep marching, realizing that this would be completely pointless, considering that some of the soldiers were in such a poor state that they even told Xenophon to kill them rather than to make them move (4.5.16). Again we can ask ourselves whether another general, such as Clearchus, would have demanded complete obedience from his men in this situation, which in turn would probably have resulted in either mass desertion or a great number of Greek losses. In both of these events, Xenophon showed his care and concern for the army. He also showed his ability to realize when to use certain methods of discipline, and when to use other tactics.

Xenophon's concern for the well being of the army was also demonstrated in his plans concerning the founding of a new city on the Black Sea (5.6). Granted, it can be argued that Xenophon wished to found a city out of selfishness, simply to make a name for himself; Thorax and Timasion attempted to convince the army of this

[28] Nussbaum 113.

(5.6.22). Delebecque brings up this point in asking whether Xenophon wished to found a city so that he could become the founder of a colony and the leader of the community.[29] Xenophon's speech in 5.7 indicates that his intentions for founding a city were honorable. He wished to maintain the unity of the army as a type of polis, and felt that this would best be accomplished by founding a new city. This desire to found a new city in Asia represents the panhellenic vision of Xenophon that is often prevalent in the *Anabasis*. According to Dillery, there are several passages in the *Anabasis* which suggest the panhellenic orientation of the work.[30] It seems that the successes of the Ten Thousand showed Xenophon that together the Greeks could accomplish whatever they undertook. Perhaps now, after having seen the Peloponnesian War divide the Greeks, Xenophon felt that united the Greeks could become as powerful and prosperous as they had been in the fifth century after the Persian Wars. These panhellenic feelings thus played a role in his desire to found a new city in Asia. It also seems though that this panhellenic vision did not allow Xenophon to realize that though the Ten Thousand were all Greeks, they were made up of different contingents, and thus were each eager to get back to their own cities and families. In spite of his desire to found a city though, when Xenophon learned that the Greeks could sail home by sea, he quickly abandoned the idea and compelled those who agreed with him to do likewise (5.6.31). Perhaps more than anything this shows that for Xenophon the care and well-being of the army were of utmost importance as long as he was their commander and it was his duty.[31]

After the accusation by some of his men that Xenophon intended to deceive the soldiers (5.7.1), he was forced to defend himself in a speech which showed his feelings on the matter at hand (5.7). As Xenophon pointed out, the accusations came

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[29] Delebecque 102.

[30] Dillery 60. Among these are 1.7.3-4, which shows the Persians as being morally and militarily inferior to the Greeks, and 1.5.9, which suggests the possibility of a united campaign against Persia. As well, 3.2.24-26, shows the freedom of the Greeks contrasted to the subjection and confinement of the Persians.

[31] On the subject of Xenophon's concern for the army, we should consider that when it was time for Seuthes to pay the Greeks (7.5), Xenophon insisted that his men be paid first, and that Seuthes could pay him another time. It seems that Xenophon was not concerned only with his own fame and fortune, but with that of his men; he believed that in the end he would be rewarded for his work, and he eventually was (7.8.23).

from men who were jealous of the respect and admiration that he had received from the soldiers. It was these same men who were guilty of wrongdoings and caused strife among the army. Xenophon's speech showed how important he felt unity was in the army, and how he never attempted to deceive the soldiers. Rather, it was others who attempted to use their authority to gain something for themselves. Xenophon made the soldiers realize that they had to stay united in order to succeed,[32] and that they should not allow themselves to be deceived by anyone as it would jeopardize their successful return. With this speech he once again endeared himself to the soldiers by reiterating the importance of the unity and cohesion of the army. The army then continued on to Calpe where after a skirmish with Pharnabazus, they awaited the arrival of Cleander, the Spartan governor of Byzantium. During their wait an incident occurred between Dexippus and Agasias, two of the soldiers, and as a result Cleander, who was present at this outburst, threatened to have the Greeks treated as public enemies (6.6.9). Since at this time the Spartans were supreme throughout Greece, Xenophon realized the serious consequences of this, and so felt compelled to intervene. Though he was innocent, Xenophon openly stated that he would be willing to accept the blame and the punishment himself, so that the whole army would not suffer for one man's actions (6.6.15). By doing so Xenophon clearly showed that he was willing to suffer for the good of the army, thus truly exemplifying his genuine concern for his men. Cleander in turn observed the true character of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand, and with a new respect for them, offered to lead the Greeks back home himself.

One aspect of Xenophon's leadership which has so far not been mentioned was his use of strict discipline to compel his men. One reason for this was that Xenophon was averse to the use of compulsion, which in the army usually meant physical chastisement.[33] It is quite evident that Xenophon used harsh discipline only as a last resource, when incentive and consent had failed, or else when it was the only way for Xenophon to prove his point. This can be seen in the incident with Soteridas (3.4.48),

[32] Again we can see the importance of order for Xenophon.
[33] Nussbaum 111.

during which Xenophon had to use force on him in order not only to maintain the respect and trust of his men, but more importantly to capture the summit of the mountain that they were ascending. At such a crucial time Xenophon could not reason with Soteridas, and thus had to execute directive leadership in order to maintain his authority. It is clear that Xenophon did this due to the immediate danger surrounding the Greeks; at any other time Xenophon would have tried to reason with the man. Xenophon was also later accused by one of his men (5.8.2-12) for having beaten him during the snowstorm in Armenia. In his defense speech Xenophon made it clear that he had beaten this man only because he had been burying a living comrade of his in the snow, rather than carrying him as he had been ordered to. Xenophon then explained that he had used corporal punishment only when there was a lack of discipline on the part of the men. He stated that he had struck people and forced them to continue marching (5.8.14), not as punishment, but rather to keep them alive. Xenophon knew that in such extreme conditions as the ones that the army suffered through in Armenia, it was often very difficult to reason with men, and it was in these situations that Xenophon resorted to using force. He used it only when he felt it was absolutely necessary and he did it for the well-being of his men, knowing that as a leader he could not let his men freeze in the snow, or die of hunger.

The examples of Xenophon's leadership can help us in attempting to understand more completely the value of Xenophon as a leader. Through an analysis of Xenophon's leadership, we can gain a better comprehension of his place in the Ten Thousand, and how Xenophon compares to other individuals, such as Clearchus, Cyrus and Agesilaus. We can thus see whether Xenophon did adhere to what he considered to be the proper ideals of a leader. In turn, we can then begin to look at and understand Xenophon as not only an historian, but also as a general and military strategist.

III

AN ANALYSIS OF XENOPHON'S LEADERSHIP

Before we can analyze Xenophon's leadership skills and his worth as a general, we must consider Xenophon's own ideas of what constituted a good general. By doing so we can see to what Xenophon may have tried to compare himself to, and if he did act accordingly. Xenophon's views on leadership are evident in a number of his works, and so it is possible to gain insight on Xenophon's feelings about leadership. We know that he admired Agesilaus, Cyrus the Elder, and Cyrus the Younger, to name a few, and considered them to be model individuals. In his encomium of Agesilaus, Xenophon begins by claiming how difficult it is to write an appreciation of him that is worthy of his virtue and glory (ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης.) (*Agesilaus* 1.1). The *Agesilaus* makes it clear that Xenophon admired the Spartan king and viewed him in a positive light. It is likely that Xenophon's friendship with Agesilaus was begun while he was in the military service of the king after his return with the Ten Thousand, and continued on well into Xenophon's life.[1] During the time Xenophon spent with Agesilaus in Asia, he had excellent opportunities to witness Agesilaus' leadership skills, which he in turn commends him for in the *Agesilaus*. Xenophon's portrait of Agesilaus makes it evident that he felt that the Spartan king possessed all the ideals and virtues which Xenophon felt that a good individual must have.[2] Since Xenophon did know Agesilaus quite well, there is the possibility that Xenophon presented certain virtues of Agesilaus in a manner to make the Spartan king appear better. However, we should note that Xenophon's Agesilaus had some of the same characteristics as Xenophon himself, namely that they had both been brought up to respect the same moral values, and they both would have judged virtue by the same traditional standards.[3] Though this does not mean that Xenophon did not glorify Agesilaus in any manner, it does suggest that Agesilaus genuinely did possess attributes which endeared

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[1] Anderson (1974) 152.
[2] These virtues, such as Agesilaus' piety and his adherence to morality, will be looked at later on.
[3] Anderson (1974) 168.

him to Xenophon, which in turn Xenophon greatly admired and felt no real need to magnify.

The relationships between Xenophon, Cyrus the Elder, and Cyrus the Younger are quite interesting and some mention of them should be made. Xenophon's chapter on the character of Cyrus the Younger (1.9) shows his feelings concerning the Persian ruler, and the *Cyropaedia* shows Xenophon's feelings about the elder Cyrus. Whereas Xenophon had personal contact with Cyrus the Younger, he of course did not know the elder Cyrus and knew of him only through legends, stories, and perhaps some written accounts. Xenophon admired what he had heard about the elder Cyrus enough to write the *Cyropaedia*, which was meant to be a paradigm for Xenophon's contemporaries.[4] According to Deborah Gera, Xenophon makes it quite apparent that Cyrus the Elder was meant to be an ideal figure whose moral conduct was well worth emulating.[5] If we agree that the *Cyropaedia* indeed was a treatise on the ideal ways and methods of governing, then it is quite valuable in studying Xenophon's theories of leadership.

The situation with Cyrus the Younger seems a bit more problematic, since the exact extent to which Xenophon knew Cyrus the Younger is difficult to say. Xenophon does mention Cyrus in the *Hellenica* (1.4.1-8, 1.5.1-10, 2.1.8-15, 3.1.1-2, 3.2.7); however, these accounts seem to be more reports of his deeds and actions rather than comments on his character. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon does portray Cyrus in a positive light (1.9), but we have to ask ourselves how much of Xenophon's account was hearsay and how much was Xenophon's own opinion. As Hirsch points out, there is no direct evidence that Xenophon and Cyrus the Younger spent any significant amount of time together; however, there are no reasons why Xenophon and Cyrus could not have become well acquainted during the march to Cunaxa.[6] It is quite possible that Xenophon did get to know Cyrus quite well during the expedition, and that many of his observations were personal ones. The fact that Xenophon knew

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[4] Bodil Due, *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods*. (Aarhus 1989) 25.
[5] Deborah Levine Gera, *Xenophon's Cyropaedia*. (Oxford 1993) 280. Cf. Everett L. Wheeler, 'The General as Hoplite', *Hoplites*. Victor Davis Hanson (ed) (London and New York 1991) 124.
[6] Hirsch 174.

Cyrus the Younger and did not know Cyrus the Elder brings up an interesting point between the two Persian rulers. Xenophon alludes to a connection between them in his characterization of the younger Cyrus by claiming that of all the Persians after Cyrus the Great, the younger Cyrus was most like a king and most deserved of an empire (1.9.1). This statement immediately brings up the question of what similarities, if any, might have been between Cyrus the Younger and Cyrus the Elder, as presented by Xenophon. James Tatum claims that there are indeed many similarities between the Cyrus of the *Anabasis* and the Cyrus of the *Cyropaedia.*[7] In reading the account of the character of Cyrus (1.9), and the description of Cambyses' advice to Cyrus the Elder (*Cyr.* 1.6), these similarities become much more evident. Both excelled in the traditional Persian system of education and proved to be superior to others their age (*Cyr.* 1.3.1, *Anab.* 1.9.5). Both were enthusiastic about hunting and were willing to take risks (*Cyr.* 1.4.8, *Anab.* 1.9.6), and perhaps most importantly, Cyrus the Elder and Cyrus the Younger were both honest and truthful (*Cyr.* 8.1.26, *Anab.* 1.9.8), admired by others (*Cyr.* 8.1.39, *Anab.* 1.9.22, 1.9.28), and desirous of bettering the deeds of others (*Cyr.* 5.3.32, 8.1.38-40, *Anab.* 1.9.11). It naturally would seem that Xenophon would have compared the younger Cyrus to his famous ancestor; however, Deborah Gera provides an interesting comment on this matter. Gera claims that at first Xenophon did compare Cyrus the Younger to his distinguished namesake, but later in writing the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon assigned the qualities of Cyrus the Younger to Cyrus the Great.[8] Whether or not this is true, it is quite clear that there are certain similarities between Cyrus the Younger and Cyrus the Elder, as presented by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* and the *Cyropaedia.*

It seems likely that Cyrus the Younger would have attempted to emulate Cyrus the Elder in his deeds and actions and in restoring the concept of Old Persia. As Hirsch points out, the younger Cyrus apparently took advantage of his name to summon up memories of the Old Persia of Cyrus the Great.[9] Because of this, much of Cyrus the Elder's character, as presented by Xenophon, could have been based on

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[7] James Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction.* (New Jersey 1989) 41.
[8] Gera 11.
[9] Hirsch 73.

Cyrus the Younger's actions. The question then arises whether Cyrus the Younger was the model for the Cyrus the Elder that is presented to us by Xenophon. It seems that he was, for as Hirsch points out, Xenophon's portrayal in the *Cyropaedia* of the character, conduct, and personal relations of Cyrus the Great was based largely on the personality of Cyrus the Younger.[10] This is not to say that Cyrus the Younger necessarily was like Cyrus the Elder, but rather that he may have presented himself as such. We have to bear in mind that everything Xenophon knew about Cyrus the Elder was second-hand information, and that much of this information would have come from Cyrus the Younger. Therefore, Xenophon's impression of the elder Cyrus was so greatly influenced by Cyrus the Younger, that Xenophon found it difficult to disassociate the younger Cyrus from his ancestor whom he claimed to imitate, and in a sense, reincarnate.[11] The reason why the younger Cyrus would have been a good model for the elder Cyrus becomes more apparent if we consider Xenophon's feelings about Cyrus the Younger and his intent in writing the *Cyropaedia*.

Although it is never stated outright, it would seem that Xenophon genuinely admired Cyrus the Younger. A large factor in stating this is that Xenophon almost always portrays Cyrus in a positive light and mentions his virtues, as is seen in the *Oeconomicus* 4.18-20, where Socrates claims that if Cyrus had lived, he would have proved an excellent ruler. Furthermore, in the first book of the *Anabasis* Xenophon does not condemn Cyrus in any way, even when he describes how Cyrus tricked the Greeks into marching against Artaxerxes (1.4.11-18). Xenophon's description of Cyrus' character (1.9) is also full of favorable deeds and characteristics of the Persian prince.[12] As well, Diogenes also writes that when Xenophon arrived in the court of Cyrus he became as fond of him as of Proxenus "καὶ ὅς γίνεται παρὰ Κύρῳ, καὶ τοῦ Προξένου φίλος οὐχ ἧττον ἦν αὐτῷ" (2.50). Aside from what Xenophon writes about Cyrus, one other factor should be considered. The simple fact that

[10] Ibid. 75.
[11] Ibid. 75.
[12] Bodil Due (188) claims that in the *Anabasis*, out of all the descriptions of the soldiers, Xenophon saw only Cyrus the Younger as a model to follow. This would indicate that Xenophon actually did admire Cyrus the Younger.

Xenophon undertook the expedition with Cyrus should say something about his feelings towards the Persians. Granted, he did go mainly because of Proxenus and because of his feelings about the political situation in Athens; however, Xenophon would not have gone if he had not had any faith or trust in Cyrus. In regards to the political situation, the restoration of a democracy after the rule of the Thirty provided Xenophon with no enthusiasm for remaining in Athens.[13] As Anderson states, at this time Xenophon was anxious to leave Athens, though not permanently,[14] and Xenophon's inquiry at Delphi seems to provide evidence for this. Though Socrates had warned Xenophon that a friendship with Cyrus might jeopardize Xenophon's political future in Athens, Xenophon seems to have made up his mind that he would undertake the expedition before he went to Delphi to ask the advice of the gods. As George Cawkwell claims, the undertaking of the expedition shows that Xenophon did have hopes of Cyrus, whereas he did not have hopes of Athens, his mother city.[15]

Though Xenophon may have begun to view Cyrus as having the potential of a great leader, the disaster at Cunaxa prevented Cyrus from ever achieving the possibility of being known as such. After all, how could Xenophon portray someone who made a serious blunder in strategy and tactics at Cunaxa as being a great leader?[16] It seems likely that the only way Xenophon felt that he could glorify Cyrus the Younger without having to mention his disaster at Cunaxa, was to assign Cyrus' notable and worthy characteristics to the fictionalized Cyrus the Elder. By doing so Xenophon could present the good qualities of Cyrus the Younger as part of an idealized ruler who in addition possessed other characteristics which were absent from the younger Cyrus. For this reason Hirsch claims that the *Cyropaedia* may have been meant to be a fantasy of what could have been if Cyrus the Younger had been victorious at Cunaxa.[17]

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[13] Cawkwell (1972) 13.
[14] Anderson (1974) 79.
[15] Cawkwell (1972) 13.
[16] We also have to consider the very likely possibility that Xenophon felt that Cyrus' death at Cunaxa was partially due to his neglect of the gods. More will be mentioned later on Cyrus' lack of piety.
[17] Hirsch 75.

Keeping in mind these points, it seems most probable that the *Cyropaedia* was written as a treatise of the ideal ruler, a paradigm of the virtues and abilities which the ideal ruler had to possess and which Xenophon embodied in the elder Cyrus.[18] According to Higgins, the entire life of Cyrus the Great represented an ideal of action.[19] The similarities of Cyrus the Younger and Cyrus the Elder might also suggest that included in this treatise was the type of ruler that Cyrus the Younger could have been, had he not been killed at Cunaxa, and also the type of leader that Xenophon might have wished him to have been.

Aside from the *Agesilaus*, the *Cyropaedia*, and the *Anabasis*, there are other works of Xenophon's which enable us to better understand his feelings on leadership. Certain individuals in the *Hellenica*, such as Teleutias and Jason of Pherae, are portrayed by Xenophon as being able and worthy leaders. In addition, through a study of the *Hipparchicus*, we can also learn Xenophon's feelings about leadership on the whole.[20] These examples will aid in understanding Xenophon's definitions and expectations of leadership, and will provide a background against which Xenophon's leadership can be compared and contrasted. The purpose of this is to be able to see to what extent Xenophon adhered to his ideals as a leader, and to judge the overall worth, value, and credit of Xenophon as a general.

One of the virtues that Xenophon felt was necessary for a good leader to have was reverence towards the gods and piety. Xenophon felt that oaths and promises to the gods were a key element of piety, and that they had to be upheld under all circumstances. For this reason, Xenophon viewed oathbreaking as being extremely impious and sacrilegious. We can see in the *Agesilaus* that Xenophon considered a large part of Agesilaus's piety to be the fact that he never broke an oath or a truce (3.2). For this reason Xenophon treats Tissaphernes' treachery as an act of impiety (*Anab.* 2.5.39), declaring him to be most ungodly (ἀθεωτάτῳ) and most treacherous

[18] Due 192.
[19] Higgins 54.
[20] Even though this work is written about commanding a cavalry unit, much of the information is very relevant to any type of military command and thus it is helpful in assessing Xenophon's opinions about the duty of a general.

(πανουργοτάτῳ). Hirsch writes that Tissaphernes is presented in the *Anabasis* as the supreme example of faithlessness and oath-breaking.[21] The reason for this is not only Tissaphernes' actual acts of treachery, but also the fact that for the Persians the breaking of an oath was a cardinal offence permitted under no circumstances, not even when dealing with the enemy.[22] If Xenophon was aware of this Persian custom, then he may have criticized Tissaphernes more severely because of the fact that he was a Persian.[23] Xenophon also makes it clear in the *Hellenica* that the Spartans were punished by the gods because they broke their oaths (5.4.1). Xenophon's feelings on the sacrilege of oathbreaking were that the names of the gods had to be depended upon under all circumstances. Unlike lying and deception, which as Xenophon points out in the *Agesilaus* (1.17) became righteous and fair (ὅσιον τε καὶ δικαιον) once war had been declared, oathbreaking was shunned by the Greeks. For this reason, for Xenophon there was no greater act of impiety than the breaking of one's oath; it brought the wrath of the gods down on the oathbreaker's head.[24] The violation of an oath was thus an invitation for divine punishment.[25] Because of this, explains Xenophon, was Socrates unwilling to break his oath, for he felt that the gods were everywhere and knew everything (*Mem.* 1.1.19). This might also indicate why Agesilaus adhered to his preset oaths with Tissaphernes even though Tissaphernes had broken the truce (*Ag.* 1.11). Although Tissaphernes had broken his oaths, Agesilaus still had to abide by his oaths that he had sworn to the gods. Agesilaus, like Xenophon, seems to have felt that the gods had to be respected in all deeds and actions regardless of the circumstances.

The maintaining of oaths was a crucial part of piety for Xenophon; however Xenophon's overall view of piety consisted of more than simply sacrificing at the right times and believing in divination. For him it consisted of a deeper belief and faith in

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[21] Hirsch 41.
[22] Ibid. 18.
[23] As Hirsch (19) points out, it would be helpful to know whether Xenophon was aware of the magnitude of oathbreaking in Persian culture, and thus whether in the *Anabasis* he knowingly accused Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes of what the Persians considered the ultimate wrongdoing.
[24] John Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London and New York 1995) 184.
[25] Jon D. Mikalson, *Athenian Popular Religion* (Chapel Hill and London 1983) 32.

the gods. This can be seen in the *Memorabilia*, in the discussion of Socrates' supposed lack of piety. Though Socrates was charged with rejecting the gods of the state, Xenophon asks how someone who had confidence in the gods, as did Socrates, could have disbelieved in the existence of gods (*Mem.* 1.1.5). Xenophon seems to feel that Socrates had a deeper belief in the gods that may not have adhered to the state's view of them. This might explain why Xenophon may have viewed Clearchus in a negative light for invoking the gods in one of his speeches (2.5.7-8). If we accept Higgins' claim that Clearchus was actually not religious, but that he used religion to impress the Persians,[26] Xenophon likely would have considered this to be an act of impiety. Though perhaps not as disrespectful as breaking an oath, Xenophon nonetheless must have considered this to be sacrilegious and irreverent. Granted, Xenophon also used religion to impress the soldiers; however, Xenophon fervently believed in sacrificing to the gods and propitiating them (*Hipparchicus* 9.9). Because of this Xenophon would not have used religion simply as a means of motivation and enticement, but rather as a genuine belief on his part.

In the *Agesilaus*, after Xenophon describes the deeds of the Spartan king, he mentions his virtues and begins first with the piety of Agesilaus (3.2). As well, in providing a summation of Agesilaus' virtues (*Ag.* 11), Xenophon again begins by mentioning his piety before stating Agesilaus' other virtues. This in turn can mean either of two things: that Agesilaus' greatest virtue was his piety and that this was most characteristic about him, or that Xenophon considered piety to be the most important virtue, and thus mentioned it first. It is likely that Agesilaus, as a Spartan, was very pious and that this is one of the things that endeared him to Xenophon. As Lazenby points out, the Spartans were a religious people, and religion played a large part in their military life.[27] Sparta was the one Greek state that was known to be willing to sacrifice her own or her allies' interests in fulfilling her duty to the gods.[28] It seems then that Agesilaus was very pious and like Xenophon, he felt that the gods

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[26] Higgins 10. We should also note that nowhere in his characterization of Clearchus does Xenophon include the fact that he was pious.
[27] Lazenby 36.
[28] Holladay and Goodman 154.

should be revered and respected at all times (*Ag.* 11.1). Keeping in mind that Xenophon considered his whole leadership of the Ten Thousand to have had a divine purpose,[29] he very well may have considered that Agesilaus' successes were also dependent upon his strong belief in an underlying divine intention.

Xenophon's belief that a successful commander, and any individual for that matter, should be pious is also evident in the *Hipparchicus*. In describing the duties of a cavalry commander, the first thing that Xenophon mentions is the necessity to sacrifice to propitiate the gods (*Hipp.* 3.1). This statement shows that Xenophon did consider appeasement of the gods to be the most important aspect of any campaign. It is clear that Xenophon's intention is to make clear that first and foremost a commander must be pious, and only after that can he be successful in strategy, tactics, and leadership.[30] Xenophon reiterates this at the end of his discussion on the duties of the cavalry commander (*Hipp.* 9.8), when he states that all the other duties are feasible if the gods give their consent. He then writes that if anyone should be surprised at his frequent exhortations of the gods, then such people do not yet realize that constant service and sacrifices to the gods are absolutely crucial in ensuring successful campaigns. Returning to Xenophon's statements about Agesilaus' piety, it is evident that Xenophon believed that Agesilaus propitiated the gods well, and that this may have been part of the reason why he was so successful in his campaigns that he never knew defeat in his lifetime (*Ag.* 10.4).

It is clear that Agesilaus, one of Xenophon's mentors, was very pious; however Cyrus the Younger, who was also admired by Xenophon, was not known for his piety.[31] It would be easy to dismiss this by stating that the Persians on the whole were not as pious as the Greeks; however, the importance of piety is stressed quite

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[29] Nussbaum 144.

[30] This would tie in to Xenophon's belief that essentially the gods decided on how successful an individual would be in his endeavors.

[31] There actually is one mention in the *Anabasis* of prophesies in regard to Cyrus (1.7.20), when Xenophon describes how Cyrus gave money to the Ambracian soothsayer Silanus. Other than this, Cyrus' piety is not mentioned. This in turn makes questionable the claim of Truesdell Brown, who states that Xenophon's description of Cyrus' character (1.9) is, in miniature, the portrait of an ideal ruler which we find in the *Cyropaedia*. Truesdell S. Brown, *The Greek Historians* (Los Angeles 1973) 99. As was stated previously, Cyrus the Younger possessed many of the same qualities as did Cyrus the Elder in the *Cyropaedia*; however, one key difference is Cyrus the Younger's lack of piety.

heavily in the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.1-7, 1.6.44-46). Brown goes as far as to claim that of Xenophon's works, the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.3-6) gives the clearest statement on the place of religion in warfare.[32] As well, Samuel Pease claims that Xenophon's admiration for Cyrus was based on the three qualities of reverence, justice, and self-control (θεοσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη).[33] Most likely, the elements of religion and reverence in the work are somewhat fictionalized, and reflect Xenophon's own beliefs. If this is true, we should question why Xenophon, who placed piety before all other virtues, admired a man who did not consider the gods to be important.[34] A possible explanation may be that Xenophon admired Cyrus for his other virtues, and thus did not hold his lack of piety against him. Though Xenophon never mentions that Cyrus was pious, he also never mentions that he was not; instead, he seems to avoid the subject altogether. The reason for this may be found in Xenophon's descriptions of other individuals such as Clearchus.

Even though Xenophon's leadership was vastly different from Clearchus', Xenophon does not condemn Clearchus for his harsh discipline nor for his actions, such as those at Cunaxa. Instead, Xenophon presents a picture of Clearchus (2.6.1-16) that, though it does not portray Clearchus as an admirable individual, does seem to present him as he really was, with very little judgment of his character. We must consider that on the march Xenophon surely must have disapproved of some of Clearchus' tactics, such as withholding the true purpose of the march from the Greeks (1.3), and the beating of one of Menon's men (1.5.11); however, he does not condemn Clearchus for these actions; rather he seems to accept them as part of his means of leadership and discipline.[35] The fact that Xenophon does not condemn Clearchus also might show Xenophon's willingness to accept individuals on their own terms. If we accept this reasoning, then it is easier to understand Xenophon's admiration of Cyrus

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[32] Brown 97.
[33] Samuel James Pease, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, "The Compleat General"', *CJ* 29 (1933-34) 440.
[34] In looking at Cyrus the Younger, we should bear in mind that Xenophon's portrayal of him is admittedly problematic. Though there are instances of default on the part of Cyrus, Xenophon carefully avoids the use of language which would imply wrongdoing on Cyrus' part. Hirsch 22-23.
[35] Perhaps Xenophon did not have to condemn Clearchus' leadership since the success of his own leadership contrasted and disproved Clearchus' conceptions of leadership. Nussbaum 111-112.

the Younger: though Xenophon probably wished that Cyrus was more reverent towards the gods, he did not allow Cyrus' seeming lack of reverence to influence his overall respect of him. Xenophon did make sure to include in the *Cyropaedia* the importance of piety. In his description of Cambyses' advice to his son Cyrus the Elder, both at the beginning (1.6.2-3) and at the end (1.6.44-46) of the speech is mentioned the importance of divine omens and guidance; the same as in Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* (3.1,9.8). It thus appears that in Xenophon's idealization of Cyrus the Younger, he felt the need to include the importance of piety. We should bear in mind that Xenophon most likely understood that Cyrus was different from himself in a number of respects, perhaps the greatest being that he was raised in Persian customs as opposed to the traditional Greek ones. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to say how Xenophon felt about the Persians in general. As Hirsch points out, Xenophon exhibited a wide spectrum of attitudes about Persia at different times and in different places.[36] Though Xenophon does accuse Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes of treachery after the capture of the Greek generals (2.5.39-40), we should recall that it was Greeks, such as Neon and Dexippus, that deceived and attempted to betray the Ten Thousand on their return from Trapezus (5.7.1, 6.6.25-29). This would suggest that Xenophon did not feel that untrustworthiness and treachery were practiced only by Persians. On the contrary, Xenophon considered Cyrus the Younger to be quite trustworthy (1.9.10-11). What may have been the case is that Xenophon originally thought that the Persians were different, rather than inferior. His views of Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes would have confirmed this; however, it may have surprised Xenophon to find an individual like Cyrus, who was quite different from other Persians like Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes. When Xenophon discovered that Cyrus the Younger was more akin to him than some Greeks were, such as Menon who possessed values markedly different from his own, he most likely did not fault Cyrus for not respecting the gods as much, realizing that it may have been a cultural custom

[36] Hirsch 140.

rather than an individual characteristic. For that reason, Xenophon admired Cyrus in spite of his lack of piety.[37]

Just as Xenophon presents his opinions on the role of piety in leadership, he also stresses the importance of strategical and tactical training on the part of the general. In his *Agesilaus*, Xenophon describes a number of the military achievements of Agesilaus in Persia and in Greece. Xenophon begins by saying that upon arriving in Persia, Agesilaus displayed good strategy by adhering to a preset armistice between Tissaphernes and himself, even though Tissaphernes had already broken the truce (*Ag.* 1.11 & *Hell.* 3.4.6). Xenophon describes this action as being Agesilaus' first noble achievement. Xenophon then further demonstrates the tactics of Agesilaus by describing how he marched to Phrygia rather than to Caria, thereby eluding Tissaphernes' army (*Ag.* 1.16-18). Xenophon claims that this is proof of sound generalship. Agesilaus' actions in the Battle of Coronea also merit mention from Xenophon who credits him with preparing an army capable of defeating the enemy (*Ag.* 2.7-9). Agesilaus' military skill also enabled him to capture Peiraeum by tricking the enemy (*Ag.* 2.17-20). Xenophon then describes how Agesilaus managed to keep Sparta safe from the attack by the Arcadians, Argives, Eleians and Boeotians (*Ag.* 2.24-26). These examples show that Agesilaus obviously was quite skilled in the art of strategy and tactics, though other works of Xenophon's perhaps present the necessary characteristics of a good leader in a more direct manner.

In order to gain a more complete understanding of Xenophon's views concerning strategy and tactics, we should look at the *Cyropaedia* and the *Hipparchicus,* in which he presents these disciplines in the form of a didactic work. In the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.10-46), Xenophon outlines the necessary duties of a leader beginning with the obtaining of supplies. As Xenophon states, a leader always had to

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[37] This is not to say that the Persians did not respect the gods at all, but rather that they most likely worshipped the gods in a way that was different from the Greeks. As Hirsch (89-90) points out, Persian religion was based on Zoroastrian practices which differed in certain ways from Greek religion. Though Xenophon observed and reported these practices, some of them, such as Cyrus' lack of sacrificing on the way to Cunaxa, likely must have seemed unusual to him and as a result Xenophon may have felt the need to include in the *Cyropaedia* elements of piety which he thought were crucial to good leadership.

know where to obtain provisions in order to keep the army well supplied. Xenophon then goes on to state that a general must always set an example for his men (*Cyr.* 1.6.17, 25), must present himself as being sympathetic to their needs and concerns (*Cyr.* 1.6.24), and be able to gain advantage over the enemy at all costs (*Cyr.* 1.6.26, 36). These sentiments are echoed in the *Hipparchicus* (5.8, 6.4-6), thereby showing that Xenophon considered them to be crucial elements in the art of generalship. In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon also presents factors such as artillery exercises (1.21), appointment of subordinate officers (2.2), the necessity to think ahead (4.1), knowledge of surrounding terrain (4.6), an understanding of the capabilities of one's own army (5.1), and an ability to defeat the enemy in battle (7.8-15). In regard to the strategy and tactics of a leader, it thus becomes clearer what Xenophon considered to be important.

In the *Hipparchicus*, 8.22, Xenophon also states the means of discipline and leadership to be employed by a general. He claims that a commander must be capable both by his words and actions of making the men under him realize that it is good to obey, to back up their leader, to have a desire to prove victorious at all costs, and to be persistent in their endeavors. Such are Xenophon's feelings about obedience and discipline; it is crucial to have obedient men who listen to their general and obey him without question. Agesilaus helped his soldiers achieve this by offering them incentives during their training. The result was that his men were eager to train, and once they were in battle they were inspired to display their military skills (*Ag.* 1.25-28). Xenophon most likely felt that this characteristic of Agesilaus was quite important, as he also describes it in the *Hellenica* (3.4.18).[38] Xenophon expands on the subject of obedience and discipline in the *Cyropaedia*, in which he claims that obedience can best be obtained by praise and honor for the obedient, and punishment and dishonor for the disobedient (1.6.20). In this statement we can see Xenophon's strong belief in willing obedience being extremely important. It appears that Xenophon felt that any type of obedience by the troops was necessary; however,

[38] What is also evident in these passages is the piety of Agesilaus, which Xenophon considered to be a crucial part of his leadership. This shows the importance that Xenophon placed upon moral virtues and the necessity of morality for good leadership: a subject which will be looked at shortly.

willing obedience achieved through incentives was the most important and effective. In the *Hellenica* there are other individuals, such as Jason of Pherae and Teleutias, who also embody the characteristics of good leadership. These should be looked at to see more clearly what Xenophon felt constituted a good leader.

In the *Hellenica* Xenophon mentions the value of a virtuous leader who was looked up to and admired by his soldiers, a leader such as Teleutias (5.1.4). Although Westlake claims that Teleutias had little claim to be ranked as a man of great distinction, he is highly praised by Xenophon for his relationship with his soldiers.[39] As Higgins points out, Xenophon does praise Teleutias for his noble qualities.[40] In the *Hellenica* Xenophon mentions Teleutias' raid on the Piraeus so as to show how Teleutias' men felt about him; Teleutias must have conducted himself in a remarkable manner in order to merit such feelings from his men (5.1.4). Xenophon remarks that such an achievement was more commendable than deeds involving greater amounts of money or greater elements of danger (5.1.4). Gray writes that this accomplishment focusses on Teleutias' moral achievement more than anything.[41] If this is so, then we can see the importance of morality that Xenophon required his ideal leaders, such as Agesilaus, to have. As well, in Teleutias' speech (*Hell.* 5.1.14-18) we can see other characteristics of the man which would have endeared him to Xenophon. Teleutias declared how he valued the lives of his men the same much as his own and that he would rather see them supplied than himself. He also claimed that his door was open to anyone at all times, showing his belief in the equality of his men. These characteristics of Teleutias' leadership are notably similar to those of other leaders, such as Agesilaus and Cyrus the Elder.

In the speech of Polydamas (*Hell.* 6.1.6), Jason of Pherae, another example of an ideal leader, is described as being strong and fond of hardship, and that his men were eager to fight for him knowing that good conduct in war would guarantee them a life of honor and reward. This sentiment is echoed later when Jason is described as knowing how to reward his men for their accomplishments (*Hell.* 6.1.15), and when

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[39] Westlake 208.
[40] Higgins 113.
[41] Vivienne Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's* Hellenica (Baltimore 1989) 8.

Xenophon describes how many states wished to become allied with Jason knowing his generosity (*Hell.* 6.4.28). Xenophon also mentions how Jason felt that voluntary cooperation was much better than forced cooperation (*Hell.* 6.1.7). Based on Jason's later achievements (*Hell.* 6.4.28), it is safe to say that his means of discipline proved to be quite successful. In most of this episode of Jason's actions (*Hell.* 6.4.20-28), his greatness is the center of attention, and Xenophon openly describes its extent at the end (*Hell.* 6.4.28).[42] This would indicate that Xenophon, who most likely did not know Jason personally, did view him as having many of the characteristics that he felt were necessary for an ideal commander.[43] By looking at Jason's methods of leadership we can also see the similarities between him and other ideal leaders of Xenophon's, such as Cyrus the Elder. According to Due, it is obvious that the virtues and abilities of Jason coincide with those of Cyrus the Elder, and thus Jason is the closest and most elaborate parallel to Cyrus in the *Hellenica*.[44]

Through looking at individuals such as Cyrus the Younger, Agesilaus, Teleutias, Cyrus the Elder, and Jason of Pherae, we can gain a better understanding of what Xenophon believed constituted a good general. Perhaps to clarify this we should present it in the form of a summary. Xenophon held the view that an ideal commander first and foremost had to be a pious individual.[45] In addition to piety, a commander had to cultivate and maintain the loyalty of his men through love and respect for them. He had to treat his men with dignity, had to be approachable by his men at all times, and be willing to listen to their complaints and suggestions. The means of discipline employed by the commander were best based on incentives rather than compulsion. In addition, he had to take care to ensure that his men were well provided for, both in food and supplies, and he had to be willing and able to share hardships and dangers

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[42] Ibid. 164.
[43] Westlake 209-210.
[44] Due 187.
[45] As Xenophon points out in the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.44,46), the gods knew all things and men were wise to consult the gods and do what the gods had bid them. This idea is repeated in the *Hipparchicus* (9.8-9), when Xenophon claims that all things are possible if the gods give their consent. Granted, Xenophon does not mention the piety of individuals such as Cyrus the Younger, Jason of Pherae, or Teleutias; however, his statements about piety in the *Cyropaedia*, the *Hipparchicus*, and the *Agesilaus* (3.2-6, 11.1-2) indicate the importance that Xenophon attached to piety and reverence of the gods.

with his men. He had to set an example for his men through his self-control and physical ability, and be willing to suffer more than them if necessary. He also had to be a skilled and innovative tactician and strategist so as to be able to defeat the enemy, and had to make certain that his men were well trained in order to ensure success in battle. Finally, an ideal leader also had to be a persuasive speaker so as to be able to raise the morale of his men and to speak and negotiate on their behalf.

What is also evident in Xenophon's qualities of good leadership is that for him a good leader had to be a moral leader. As mentioned, Xenophon's statement about Teleutias (*Hell.* 5.1.4) shows that he considered Teleutias' leadership to be dependent upon his morality. The need for morality in a great leader is also pointed out in the *Agesilaus*, in which Xenophon adds to the end a list of Agesilaus' moral virtues (11). Xenophon seems to feel that Agesilaus' virtues were so great that they had to be repeated so that they could be remembered by others more easily. As Xenophon states, these virtues included his reverence for religion and his strict adherence to oaths (3). Another of his virtues was his justice in money matters, his financial assistance to his friends, and his lack of greed concerning money (4). Agesilaus's self-control was also admired by Xenophon (5). As Xenophon points out, Agesilaus was not controlled by a desire for drunkenness, overeating, sleep or indolence. Rather, he was always in control of his own body and he always made an effort to endure more than others. His courage was another of his virtues, as was shown by his many successes over stronger enemies (6). In addition to this, his wisdom won the obedience of his citizens and the respect and devotion of his friends. Agesilaus' adherence to the laws of the state not only showed how honorable he was, but also showed his patriotism, as did his friendship with the Greeks (7). Yet another of Agesilaus' virtues was his urbanity and civility that he demonstrated at all times, not only among his friends, but among all individuals, showing his genuine belief in goodwill towards all men (8).

In addition to Xenophon's outline of Agesilaus' virtues, throughout the work Xenophon mentions qualities of Agesilaus' leadership. Following the description of some of Agesilaus' successful battles, Xenophon writes that no one could deny that Agesilaus' conduct was marked by good sense (εὐγνωμόνως)(*Ag.* 2.25). Xenophon

seems to feel that the accounts of Agesilaus' deeds speaks for themselves in showing the value of Agesilaus' strategy and tactics. As Xenophon writes, the actions of Agesilaus needed no proofs or examples, for the mention of them should have been enough to command immediate belief (*Ag.* 3.1).[46]

Cyrus the Great is another individual who is presented as an ideal leader with many moral qualities. At the beginning of the work Xenophon claims that Persian laws were designed to make their citizens incapable of setting their hearts on any wicked or shameful conduct (*Cyr.* 1.2.3). Until the age of twelve, Cyrus was brought up like this (*Cyr.* 1.3.1), and his actions during his lifetime show that he did adhere to these laws that he had learned in his boyhood (*Cyr.* 1.6.27,32). In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon also makes evident the generosity of Cyrus (1.4.26, 8.1.39, 8.2.12), and shows that Cyrus gained and kept friendships partly due to this generosity. As well, Cyrus considered friends to be of utmost importance, and so he strove to keep his old friends loyal to him as well as to gain new friends. Xenophon cites many examples of Cyrus' kindness to his friends and even to his enemies (*Cyr.* 1.4.26, 3.1.31, 3.2.12, 4.5.32, 5.3.32, 7.1.42-43, 7.2.26, 7.3.8, 7.5.41, 8.2.1, 8.2.25-26, 8.7.13, 8.7.28). These examples not only show Cyrus' treatment of his own friends, but also his desire to turn enemies into friends by treating them with repect and courtesy (*Cyr.* 3.1.31, 3.2.12, 7.1.42-43, 7.2.26). Cyrus' kindness to strangers can also be seen in his treatment of his slaves (*Cyr.* 8.1.44), which Gera claims earned Cyrus the title of 'father' to them.[47] Overall, it can safely be said that Cyrus considered friendship to be one of the most crucial elements of good leadership, as on his deathbed he bid his sons to remember his final saying which was to show kindness to their friends (*Cyr.* 8.7.28). Another of Cyrus' moral qualities was his modesty, which is also evident throughout the work (3.1.42, 5.1.1, 5.4.32, 7.1.17, 8.1.5, 8.4.14, 8.7.6, 8.7.25). Cyrus' lifetime of modesty seems to culminate in his actions on his deathbed when he remains modest about his lifetime accomplishments (8.7.6), and when he states his desire not to have

[46] On this note we should point out that in Xenophon bad deeds also can speak for themselves. For this reason Xenophon might not have condemned some of the actions of Clearchus or Menon, since he felt that their actions alone would cast judgement on their character.
[47] Gera 295.

an ornate funeral, but instead to be buried straightaway (8.7.25). Another of Cyrus' moral virtues which Xenophon admired was his trustworthiness, which enabled others to believe Cyrus and to put their faith in him (*Cyr.* 1.6.11, 1.6.32, 5.2.8, 5.4.33, 5.5.15). It is evident that throughout the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon makes mention of Cyrus' morality, since he felt that it was an important part of ideal leadership. Apart from the previous examples, Xenophon also provides illustrations of Cyrus' character which made him so well loved and appreciated by others (*Cyr.* 1.5.1, 3.1.15, 3.1.41, 5.1.8, 6.1.48, 7.1.18, 7.1.38, 7.5.77-84, 7.5.86, 8.1.26,30,39,43). Among these descriptions are included the evident nobleness and superiority of Cyrus (1.5.1), praise for his wisdom, endurance, and gentle nature (3.1.41), the admiration and love of his men (7.1.38), and his everpresent adherance to his moral values and beliefs (8.1.26). Based on Xenophon's description of Cyrus it appears that he did possess the necessary morals, as did Agesilaus, which Xenophon so admired.

Apart from elements of ideal leadership, in the *Anabasis* Xenophon also makes clear the characteristics of less than ideal leadership. This is made clear mainly through Xenophon's comments about other leaders and generals of the Ten Thousand, such as Proxenus, Clearchus, Menon, and Chirisophus. By looking at these leaders, we can see elements of their leadership which contrasted greatly with that of Xenophon's ideal leaders, such as Agesilaus, Teleutias, Jason, and Cyrus the Great. As Xenophon points out, the main problem with Proxenus was that he was unable to impress and motivate his soldiers either through respect or fear (2.6.19).[48] As a result he was hard-pressed to encourage his men to undertake difficult tasks. As well, Proxenus was apt to depend upon incentive alone, which formed the basis of his command.[49] The problem with Proxenus' reliance upon reward and incentives was that he ended by being an object of contempt to his men because instead of punishing wrongdoers, he merely withheld praise from them (2.6.20).[50] These characteristics

[48] Unfortunately, Proxenus did not have a chance to demonstrate his skills in personal leadership while Clearchus was present. Nussbaum 135. We can thus only speculate about Proxenus' leadership of the Ten Thousand.
[49] Nussbaum 111.
[50] Wood 52.

show that Proxenus was unable to secure the trust and respect of his men in the manner of others like Teleutias and Jason. As a result, Proxenus could never attain the same admiration and compliance from his men as Teleutias or Jason had.

Contrasted quite heavily with the leadership skills of Proxenus are the skills of Clearchus. For completely different reasons than Proxenus, Clearchus was also unable to gain complete trust and respect from his men. Whereas Proxenus was unable to do so due to his dependence upon rewards and praise, Clearchus felt that the only way to earn the respect of his men was through fear and compulsion. From Clearchus' actions until Cunaxa as well as the manner in which Xenophon presents his character (2.6.1-16), we can see the obedience that Clearchus exacted from his men through fear, compulsion, and punishment, as well as his overall devotion to war. As Xenophon points out (2.6.2), as long as Sparta and Athens were at war, Clearchus was content to stay in Greece. Once the Peloponnesian War had ended, he was intent on attacking the Thracians in the north, and after being exiled, did attack them with the financial support of Cyrus. After his victory over the Thracians, he then set out with Cyrus in hopes of fighting other battles with him (2.6.5). During the march examples of Clearchus' harsh leadership can be seen. When the Greeks first realized that they were not marching against the Pisidians they refused to go any farther, to which Clearchus responded by trying to force them to march (1.3.1). Only after nearly being stoned to death, did Clearchus attempt to persuade the soldiers by winning them over. This incident shows quite clearly that Clearchus' first reaction to any disobedience was to use force, and only if that did not work to try other means of compelling his men. This is also evident in the account of the Greeks crossing the water-filled canals and ditches that blocked their retreat (2.3.11-13). In this description Xenophon mentions that Clearchus beat any man that seemed to be slacking. This statement quickly reminds us of the type of discipline that Clearchus adhered to: punishment as a matter of principle, and obedience at whatever price. Granted, Xenophon does point out that in difficult times the soldiers gave Clearchus complete confidence and wished for no one better (2.6.11); however, Xenophon also states that when the danger was over, Clearchus lost many of his men through desertion (2.6.12). This statement makes

clear that Clearchus' men did not enjoy serving under him at all times, as did Xenophon's men (7.5.10). In turn it seems safe to say that an army led by Clearchus did not possess the cohesion and unity which Xenophon professed were so important, since the men were not able to put all their faith and trust in Clearchus.

Another factor in the leadership of Clearchus was that due to his desire to maintain complete obedience from his men through fear and compulsion, he did not treat them as equals. Clearchus was of the opinion that as the leader he had to have the complete obedience of his men at all times. This can be seen in Clearchus' decision to order a beating for one of Menon's soldiers, even though that man was under the direct authority of Menon, and not Clearchus (1.5.11). The result was that Clearchus was nearly stoned to death for his attempt to dominate one of Menon's soldiers and he nearly caused the Greeks to begin fighting amongst themselves (1.5.12-17). The reaction by Menon's men to Clearchus' actions suggests that the majority of the army would not have tolerated a system of discipline which approached all on a lower level than that natural and appropriate to them,[51] a system adhered to by Clearchus. Clearchus' actions in this incident also show that he could not accept that someone else's authority would take precedence over his own. For this reason, Xenophon states that although Clearchus had great qualities as a soldier (2.6.7), he was very authoritative, harsh, demanding, and very reluctant to serve under anyone else (2.6.8-12). The overall result of these leadership characteristics was that Clearchus was unable to secure a genuine respect, trust, and admiration of his men due to his exceeding demands of complete obedience, his harsh demeanor, and his dependance upon compulsion and fear as a primary means of motivation.

Out of the other five original generals, the only one that Xenophon mentions anything important about is Menon. Through Xenophon's description of him (2.6.21-29), it is evident that Menon's primary incentive was to gain more money and power in any way that he saw fit. He felt that lying, deceit, and perjury were acceptable means of reaching his ambitions. As a result he felt no affection for anyone and looked upon men with scruples and morals with disdain and ridicule. Xenophon's description

[51] Nussbaum 111.

of him makes it quite clear that Menon was completely the opposite of an ideal leader. His disposition and character show that he was a degenerate, led by wealth and other forms of personal gratification, who excelled in unscrupulous shamelessness, and neither valued nor understood what genuine leadership was.[52] For this reason, Menon's characteristics appear in stark contrast to those of Agesilaus, Cyrus the Great, Jason of Pherea, and Teleutias, and in turn Menon exemplifies poor and corrupt leadership qualities.

One final individual that must be looked at is Chirisophus, the eventual supreme commander of the Ten Thousand (6.1.32). Chirisophus is interesting in that there are contrasting views about him. Parke states that as a typical Spartan, he was probably the worst choice for a brigand-chief, while Nussbaum commends him and claims that it was Chirisophus who was the closest to Xenophon in the spirit of his leadership.[53] Based on the results of Chirisophus' leadership, namely the dissolution of the army (6.2), it seems that Chirisophus was indeed a poor choice. Immediately after he was appointed as supreme commander, the Arcadians protested and stated that he was appointed by virtue of being a Spartan rather than according to his ability (6.1.30). The Arcadians' disapproval of Chirisophus is what resulted in the splitting up of the army, since they claimed that an Athenian and a Spartan should not command an army of which more than half its soldiers consisted of Arcadians and Achaeans (6.2.10). It thus seems obvious that the appointment of Chirisophus is what caused the Arcadians to leave the army since before, when Xenophon was the main commander, they did not have notions of leaving the army, and seemed content with Xenophon's leadership.

The manner in which Xenophon presents Chirisophus is quite interesting, as he gives him relatively little credit, as if his position was not very important. In contrast, Diodorus states that upon the replacement of the original generals, the army chose several generals but accorded the leadership of the whole army to Chirisophus (14.27.1). In addition it is quite possible that in Ephorus' account, and perhaps

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[52] Ibid. 137-138.
[53] Parke 37, Nussbaum 131.

Sophaenetus', Chirisophus played the part that was played by Xenophon in his own account.[54] Xenophon does not tell us much about Chirisophus, mainly stating speeches made by him during the retreat (3.1.45-47, 3.3.3, 4.6.7, 4.6.16, 4.7.3-8). Though there is one reported dispute between the two (4.6.3), Xenophon makes it appear that they got along reasonably well. However, since we do have so little information about Chirisophus, it is somewhat difficult to assess his leadership skills. In spite of this, there are some points that can and should be made. Xenophon mentions that upon reaching Trapezus, Chirisophus volunteered to leave the army and to return with triremes and transports (5.1.4), though we later find out that Chirisophus did not return until Sinope, bringing nothing except only one ship and congratulations from Anaxibus (6.1.16). This tends to question the trustworthiness of Chirisophus since he misled the Greeks into believing that he would return with ships for all of them. On the subject of his trustworthiness, we also have to take into account Xenophon's uncertainty about Chirisophus returning with the ships (5.1.10). Although this statement could be attributed to personal animosity between Xenophon and Chirisophus, it is more likely that Xenophon doubted Chirisophus' integrity and honesty. This in turn would question an aspect of Chirisophus' leadership since Xenophon considered honesty, sincerity, and truthfulness to be crucial elements of ideal leadership (*Cyr.* 8.1.26, *Ag.* 11.13).

At this time, when Chirisophus finally returned, Xenophon refused the supreme command and Chirisophus was elected the main commander of the Ten Thousand (6.1.32). The dissolution of the army, only six or seven days after Chirisophus' appointment, broke Chirisophus' spirit, eventually turning him against the army (6.2.14). Though this might indicate the genuineness of his spirit in leadership, showing that when this was broken he himself was a broken man,[55] it also shows that he was a relatively weak man. In comparison Xenophon, to whom public service was

[54] Cawkwell (1972) 19. Cawkwell (1972) 20, also claims that Chirisophus may have attained the position of seniority which Clearchus had previously attained, a fact which Xenophon obscured. Again this leads into the problem of how reliable Xenophon's account was.
[55] Nussbaum 132.

also extremely important,[56] was able to withstand the break up of the army through his trust in the gods. We should remember that Xenophon sacrificed to the gods immediately before the army broke up, as to inquire whether he should stay with the army or whether he should abandon it (6.2.15). Though the army did split up Xenophon must have felt that things would turn out favorably since the gods had bid him to remain with the army, rather than to leave on his own. The fact that Chirisophus' sole leadership lasted only six or seven days thus does not bode well for his qualities as a leader. As well, the fact that Chirisophus turned against the army after his leadership had come to an end, indicates that he was easily discouragable and was somewhat insecure in his leadership, qualities that appear to be less than ideal.

Having looked at what Xenophon believed constituted ideal leadership and his examples of inferior leadership, we should now focus our attention on a more important matter: whether Xenophon actually practiced these ideals of worthy and noble leadership and if he lived up to the expectations that he had established for others.

For Xenophon, piety was likely the most important element of his leadership; surely he believed in what he wrote, that all was possible if the gods gave their consent (*Hipp* 9.8). According to Dillery, Xenophon felt that the gods had a role in shaping history, and that Xenophon relied on the divine to explain the shaping of human affairs;[57] his actions during the march are indicative of this. Xenophon repeatedly represents himself as sacrificing before military operations in order to see whether the projected operation would succeed or fail.[58] His piety during the expedition was nothing new as Xenophon was a devout believer in divine signs; there is no cause for surprise that he followed them religiously, in both his public and his private life.[59] As concerns piety, it is safe to say that Xenophon did adhere to the principles that he set out in his literary works. As Diogenes wrote, Xenophon was pious, fond of

[56] Xenophon's commitment to public service can be seen in his decision to stay with the army until the very end until they had received their pay (7.5.1, 7.7.40, 7.7.50).
[57] Dillery 180.
[58] Anderson (1974) 34. We should though keep in mind that no skilled Greek commander took the field without advice from skilled prophets. Anderson (1970) 69.
[59] Holladay and Goodman 155.

sacrificing, and skilled in augury (2.56). His conduct during the march shows that, like Agesilaus (*Ag.* 11.1-2), he too revered all holy places and gave thanks to the gods in the hour of success (*Anab.* 4.8.25-26). His reverence to the gods at all times thus enabled the gods to give counsel to him during the march, one of the things which he claimed was possible through propitiation (*Hipp.* 9.9). In the *Anabasis*, we can see that Xenophon did this regularly, and through the use of dreams, omens, sacrifices, and oracles, he made all the decisions which concerned him and his army (3.1.4-8, 3.1.11-12, 3.2.8-9, 4.3.8-9, 6.1.20-24, 6.2.15, 6.4.12-22, 6.5.21).[60]

Regarding strategy and tactics, the success of the expedition clearly shows that Xenophon's military strategy was well thought out and executed. The examples of the tactics practiced by the army, as mentioned in Chapter Two, show the use of intuitiveness, originality and adherence to traditional Greek warfare methods that were employed by Xenophon and the other generals. Other specific examples from the *Anabasis* also show how Xenophon adhered to the beliefs that he had set out in the *Hipparchicus* and the *Cyropaedia*. The procuring of supplies from the camp of Tirabazus (4.4), at Trapezus (4.8.19), and the plundering expeditions against the Drilae (5.2), show Xenophon's ability to provide the army with supplies at all times. Xenophon's success in supplying the army with provisions is made evident by the relatively low mortality rate of the Ten Thousand considering the circumstances. Although a number of the soldiers did suffer and die from hunger (4.5.7-16), Xenophon did not lose a large part of his army to starvation, as did Alexander the Great when he attempted to cross the Gedrosian desert (Arrian 6.4.24-27). Xenophon's ability to gain mountain heights from the enemy by stealth and hard work (3.4.41, 4.2.13), and the successful crossing of the Centrites river (4.3.20-33), are evidence of his ability to take advantage of the enemy. His decision to equip the Greeks with cavalry and slingers (3.3.16-20) showed his ability to think ahead, as well as to be aware of the surrounding terrain. As well, Xenophon's decision to march at night was dependent upon the observation that a Persian army was useless at night (3.4.35). The different ways of marching, as seen in the use of the mobile force of

[60] Mikalson 45.

troops (3.4.19) and the creation of a body of reserves (6.5.9), show that Xenophon and the other leaders were aware of the capabilities of their own army. Whereas the Greeks traditionally used a solid line of hoplite soldiers, Xenophon and the other soldiers quickly recognized that this would not do in the territory of Persia. The wide open terrain did not allow the Greeks to protect the flanks of their battleline by using natural obstacles, such as mountains or hills, as they did in Greece. These examples of Xenophon's strategy correspond to what he had mentioned in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Hipparchicus* and overall show that the successful return of the Ten Thousand proves that Xenophon did comply with his beliefs of what constituted wise and sensible strategy and tactics.

The methods of leadership and discipline that Xenophon employed, as presented in the previous chapter, correspond to what Xenophon wrote about discipline. First and foremost, Xenophon's mention in the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.20) that willing obedience was the best type of obedience corresponds directly to his aversion to the use of compulsion, and to the whole tendency of his leadership: positive discipline and the respect of public opinion and active citizenship.[61] Granted, there were times that Xenophon did use compulsion, as previously stated, but as Xenophon points out he did this for the good of his soldiers, just as doctors cut and cauterize for the good of their patients (5.8.19). As well, we should consider that he abstained from any type of physical chastisement once the army was out of its most extreme straits.[62] If we consider this point, that Xenophon used compulsion only when absolutely necessary, then it becomes more of a positive aspect to his leadership rather than a negative one. Xenophon's use of compulsion shows that he knew enough about leadership and discipline to know what was necessary at different times. He was able to select from the different elements of leadership and employ those which suited the situation the best. The idea of positive discipline which Xenophon adhered to is also presented in the *Hipparchicus* (6.2), where Xenophon states that when a commander is kind to his men, a feeling of loyalty will naturally be fostered. This is shown in the

[61] Nussbaum 111.
[62] Ibid. 111.

Anabasis in numerous cases where Xenophon treated the men as equals, valued the opinions of all, and even placed his men before himself at times (3.2.38, 4.3.10, 5.2.13, 7.5.1-4). Xenophon's love for his men is nowhere better seen than in Seuthes' statement in which he claims that Xenophon's main problem was that he was too much of a friend of the ordinary soldiers (7.6.4). The type of discipline that Xenophon employed in the March of the Ten Thousand thus corresponds quite well to the means of discipline that Xenophon proclaimed to be correct in the *Cyropaedia*, the *Agesilaus*, the *Hellenica*, and the *Hipparchicus*.

The study of Xenophon's means of discipline, his adherence to piety, and his successful strategy and tactics all show that Xenophon did practice the ideals he had outlined and established for others in his works. If we consider the summation of what Xenophon considered to be characteristics of an ideal general, it is clear that Xenophon followed these principles that he had set out. For Xenophon compliance to his professed ideologies of leadership was very important. Xenophon felt that just as Agesilaus, Jason, Teleutias, and Cyrus the Great, he too had to convince his men of his superiority by personal example.[63] For this reason Xenophon felt that he had to adhere to the principles that he believed were right and just, and that he could not expect his men to abide by his code of ethics unless he himself demonstrated them.

Xenophon's leadership also shows that he possessed moral qualities and values, as had Agesilaus and Cyrus the Great. Through a study of the *Anabasis* we can see examples of Xenophon's morality such as his belief in the value of friendship and his kindness to his friends. For this reason Xenophon often put the interests of others before his own (6.6.15, 7.5.3). For Xenophon though, friendship was extremely important and this was why he went out of his way to help others (6.3.13). Xenophon even jeopardized his own fortunes so that he could ensure that his soldiers would be better off (7.6.34-36). Quite simply, Xenophon's morality dictated that he should not put his interests before those of his friends (7.7.39-40). Xenophon's value of friendship can also be seen in his acceptance of the opinions of others. Xenophon was able to accept blame thrust upon him and to accept freely the beliefs and suggestions

[63] Wood 53.

of his men (3.3.12, 5.6.31, 5.7.10). Like Agesilaus, Xenophon associated with all men and accepted them based on their actions. The reason for this was that Xenophon did not consider himself any better than others and felt that the opinions of others were as valuable as his own (4.4.12). The result was that Xenophon was in turn greatly admired and respected by his men, in much the same manner as Agesilaus had been. This is not only evident through the successful return of the Ten Thousand, but also through the feelings expressed by Xenophon's men, such as Timasion, Phryniscus and Cleanor (7.5.10), who claimed that they would not serve without Xenophon even with five months' pay. These sentiments echo the feelings that Teleutias' men had for him (*Hell.* 5.1.4). Xenophon's admiration by his men shows that his men did value the honesty, generosity and modesty of Xenophon. It also shows that Xenophon's willingness to endure hardships, and his courage, wisdom, and urbanity, all were factors in the love, respect, obedience, and devotion that Xenophon got from his men.

The soldiers' high opinions of Xenophon are evident throughout the *Anabasis*, such as Chirisophus' exhortation of Xenophon's virtues and his claim that he wished that there were more like Xenophon in the army (3.1.45). As well, we should remember that after the murder of the generals, the remainder of Cyrus' veterans did choose him as their commander-in-chief, and overall there was very little opposition to the appointment of Xenophon. As Anderson points out, they would not have done this if they had not trusted him and had faith in him.[64] They did though have faith in Xenophon, and being convinced that he knew best, gave up their own ideas and followed him willingly.[65] What these examples show is that Xenophon's men were aware of his feelings towards them and they respected and admired Xenophon enough to give him the same trust and esteem. Xenophon sums up his moral qualities in his statement to Seuthes, that whereas others consider money and power important, he considered nothing to be nobler than friendship, virtue, justice and generosity (7.7.41). Xenophon genuinely believed this and tried to comply with these moral principles as best he could.

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[64] Anderson (1974) 84.
[65] Edith Hamilton, *The Greek Way* (Chicago 1963) 200.

An analysis of Xenophon's leadership demonstrates that he did adhere to his doctrines of leadership, and that the success of the Ten Thousand was in turn dependent upon Xenophon's compliance to these convictions. It thus seems very easy to say that Xenophon fervently believed these to be the proper ideals and that he lived up to them; however, since the primary account of the Persian Expedition was written by the same individual who had written the treatises on ideal leadership, we should approach this issue with some caution.

The possibility exists that Xenophon altered the accounts of his leadership in order to suit the ideals presented in the *Cyropaedia* or the *Hipparchicus*. In addition, there is also the slight possibility that Xenophon wrote the 'ideals' of a general to suit his actions in the march. As Wood points out, one can argue that all of Xenophon's precepts regarding the art of leadership are the result of his own acquaintance with handling men, such as his march with the Ten Thousand.[66] It seems though, that neither of these possibilities is true. Xenophon's treatises must surely have consisted of what he genuinely felt was right; thus if he did alter anything, he may have altered the accounts of his actions during the expedition in order to suit his view of an ideal leader. Without any other original sources, it is virtually impossible to know the exact truth of the *Anabasis*. Cawkwell points out some of the limitations of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, but he wonders whether we should reject the one, full eye-witness account we have in favor of the skeleton of someone else's.[67] In response to Cawkwell's query, it seems that we should trust Xenophon's account for the most part. We must consider that if Xenophon's account of his own actions was markedly different from reality, another historian, such as Plutarch or Diodorus, would likely have mentioned that Xenophon's account was a blatant exhortation of himself. We should also consider, as Hippolyte Taine points out, that when Xenophon begins to speak of himself (3.1.4-26), he does so with no conceit or false modesty, saying what he did without giving himself any more or any less prominence than what he actually did during the expedition; Xenophon speaks of himself in the third person, with the same

[66] Wood 59.
[67] Cawkwell (1972) 19.

plainness and indifference that he gives to other people.[68] The way it stands, it seems that Xenophon's accounts of his leadership are for the most part reliable, and that Xenophon did actually practice the ideals that he had set out in his other works.

It is quite apparent that Xenophon's leadership was good, and that the retreat was a success with him as leader. Bearing this in mind, we should then attempt to look at his leadership in a broader context. Would he have been less successful in another type of expedition? Could Xenophon have commanded a regular hoplite army in a 'normal' battle? Was Xenophon successful only because the Ten Thousand were who they were? There are no direct answers to these questions mainly because the views on Xenophon's leadership are not of one accord; however, there are definite possibilities that arise through a study of Xenophon and his leadership.

It becomes evident that Xenophon's leadership suited the army of the Ten Thousand very well. Overall, it seems to have been mainly due to his ability and eloquence, as Xenophon presents it, that the very large and formidable body of mercenaries cut their way through Persia and returned to Greece.[69] We must remember that one of the things which made Xenophon's leadership so successful was the fact that he was able to draw upon different elements of leadership depending on what the situation required. Xenophon had an instinct which told him how best to adapt the means at his disposal to a given end.[70] This is evident in the different types of tactics that he used, as well as his realization that one means of discipline could not work at all times. What this means is that Xenophon applied the types of leadership that he instinctively felt were necessary. Xenophon understood that he was setting a precedent by marching through the interior of Persia, since no Greek army had ever been victorious there.[71] In this sense Xenophon did not have any rigid rules of generalship that had to be adhered to. These are the things that made Xenophon such a successful general: that he had such a diverse background, and that he was not a

[68] Hippolyte Taine, *Essais de critique et d'histoire* (Paris 1904) 171.
[69] Mahaffy 104.
[70] H.G. Dakyns, *The March of the Ten Thousand* (London 1901) xxii.
[71] Bury and Meiggs 332.

rule-of-thumb tactician and drill sergeant, for this would have been fatal to him and to the army.[72]

In spite of these commendations, his leadership, as portrayed in the *Anabasis*, probably would not have suited another type of military situation. A reason for this is that the leadership of the Ten Thousand was of an exceptional kind; the problems encountered by the leaders differed fundamentally from those of conventional Greek warfare.[73] This is not to say, however, that he could not have commanded another army. The question why Xenophon did not command an army again after his experience with the Ten Thousand is a difficult one, and to understand this better we have to look at why Xenophon originally undertook the march. As mentioned previously, Xenophon undertook the march as an observant; disillusioned with the Athenian democracy, he left to seek his fortune with the generous prince Cyrus.[74] It is quite possible that Xenophon would have been happy to have remained an observer the whole march; however, the execution of the generals changed all this. Thus when Xenophon finally handed over the army to Thibron in Pergamon (7.8.23-24), he had undergone more than he could have possibly imagined through his experiences with the Ten Thousand. His experience as leader left him with both positive and negative feelings about the army as well as about mercenary service in general. Though Xenophon left the army a seemingly happy man, at peace with the gods and monetarily rewarded, he was most likely somewhat disillusioned with his whole experience. This is evident in the last books of the *Anabasis*, which are underlain with a sense of disappointment and disillusionment.[75] Although the reasons why he was disillusioned are not completely obvious, a few suggestions can be made.

The idea of disappointment and disillusionment in the *Anabasis* is an interesting one in that there is also disillusionment at the end of the *Cyropaedia* (8.8), the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* (14), and the *Hellenica* (7.5.26-27). Xenophon ends off the *Hellenica* with a pessimistic outlook of Greece after the battle

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[72] Dakyns xxii.
[73] Westlake 212.
[74] Mather and Hewitt 24.
[75] Dakyns xxv.

of Mantinea. This can be noticed in his statement that no city in Greece was better off after the Peloponnesian War, but rather that there was even more confusion and uncertainty in Greece than previously. As well, Xenophon finishes off his history by suggesting that perhaps someone else might look after subsequent events in Greek history (*Hell.* 7.5.27). It appears as if Xenophon felt that there was no hope left for Greece, as if everything that he had believed in was destroyed. In addition, the *Cyropaedia* also ends with a rather pessimistic outlook (8.8) in which Xenophon denounces the contemporary Persian mores and customs, showing how much the Persians have deteriorated.[76] Xenophon makes it clear that the present day Persians were less religious, less brave, and less dutiful and just than Persians during the time of Cyrus the Great. His negative views and feelings of them are quite clear. The pessimistic ending of the *Cyropaedia* somewhat echoes the ending of the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* (14), in which Xenophon criticizes contemporary Spartans as compared to prior generations. These depressing endings in the *Hellenica*, the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, the *Cyropaedia* and the *Anabasis* definitely say something about Xenophon. It seems that in each case Xenophon was disillusioned with the present world around him, especially when compared to previous generations. Perhaps Xenophon had set his ideals too high, or perhaps he was simply noticing the true decline of society; however, it is clear that Xenophon was dissillusioned enough to state prominently his dissatisfaction at the ends of some of his works. Xenophon's disillusionment is also very evident in the *Anabasis*, and therefore must be looked at.

Xenophon viewed the Ten Thousand as a model society; a 'blueprint' utopia in action.[77] Following the execution of the generals, the Ten Thousand immediately were united by everyone's desire to return home safely. Until the army reached Trapezus, the army had acted as a city; everyone lived together, fought together, and did what was best for the community. It seems as if Xenophon, disillusioned by the breakdown of democracy in Athens, had finally found what he considered to be an ideal community based on social order and discipline. For Xenophon, the main function of

[76] Gera 299.
[77] Dillery 59.

the rational organization of society was to facilitate good discipline and strong purposeful leadership;[78] Xenophon found this in the Ten Thousand. Unfortunately for Xenophon, once the army had reached the Black Sea the unity began to lessen. The Greeks now saw that it was likely that they would arrive home safely, and so the need to remain in such a tightly formed community was not as great as before. Nussbaum describes this point as one in which the army approached most closely to the condition of a 'normal' city-state, since its organization was no longer wholly dependent on extreme external pressure.[79] This can be seen in the eventual breakup of the army into three divisions (6.2.16). Prior to this though, Xenophon had attempted to found a city at Sinope, perhaps as a last effort to keep the Ten Thousand unified as the model society that he envisioned. Unfortunately for Xenophon, many of the soldiers were career mercenaries who desired to continue on in military life, and who did not wish to settle in one permanent location.[80] Quite simply, Xenophon's attempt at founding a city shows that he would have liked most to freeze the Ten Thousand in time and to settle them.[81] The reality was that a large, organized, and unified army such as the Ten Thousand would have had no place in Greece; this is one of the reasons why the Spartans initially did not want the Ten Thousand to return back to Greece. The overall result of the disagreements and temporary disbanding of the army during the return to the Bosporus was that they subdued Xenophon's ideals. During this time Xenophon finally realized that his ideal community could not survive as he wished, and that it would have to abide by the mores of the Hellenic world. As a result he also had no desire to command an army in Greece, and instead remained in Persia with Agesilaus, in whom he had found new ideals and admiration.

Xenophon was thus left both disappointed and indifferent about his military experience with the Ten Thousand. For this reason he had no real desire to become a permanent military general, even though he might have been capable of this. Interestingly, Mahaffy claims that this was not the case; instead, Xenophon would

[78] Wood 55.
[79] Nussbaum 150.
[80] Delebecque 105.
[81] Dillery 96.

have commanded an army again but he was not given the chance.[82] Mahaffy's argument seems to overlook one aspect of Xenophon's character, namely, that he never intended to be a career general. Xenophon became the leader of the Ten Thousand from necessity rather than from a desire to be a general. From the little that we know of Xenophon's early years, it seems that Xenophon was more interested in following the teachings of Socrates than commanding an army (Diogenes Laertius 2.56). Though Xenophon did learn valuable lessons from his experience with the Ten Thousand, there were clearly other issues in his life that captivated him and garnered his attention, such as horsemanship, hunting, augury, and of course, literature (Diogenes 2.56). If this is combined with Xenophon's disillusionment about Greece, then it becomes more evident why he had no wish to continue being a mercenary leader. Any army that he could possibly command could not live up to the ideals that he had envisioned in the Ten Thousand. For him, the Ten Thousand had been a model community and army which he had been fortunate enough to command. Once this period was over, Xenophon was content in his knowledge that he could never possibly achieve happiness through a military command. What finally happened to the Ten Thousand at the end, in essence turned Xenophon away from any love of command which he may have acquired during the retreat.

In addition to Xenophon's dissapointment with the break-up of the Ten Thousand, it is also possible that Xenophon's exile led to his overall disillusionment with Greece and Greek ideals. As previously mentioned, the Ten Thousand were not regarded as heroes upon their return to Greece, but rather were treated as nothing more than a group of mercenaries. This treatment of the Ten Thousand likely was a factor in Xenophon's decision not to return to Greece right away. Instead, he stayed in Asia looking after the remnants of the Ten Thousand as *strategos* from 399 B.C. until he was relieved of his command by Agesilaus in late 396 B.C. or early 395 B.C.[83] Bury and Meiggs claim that Xenophon did not return to Athens immediately since it

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[82] Mahaffy 106.

[83] Peter J. Rahn, 'The Date of Xenophon's Exile', *Classical Contributions: Studies in honor of M.F. McGregor*. Gordon Spencer Shrimpton and David Joseph McCargar (edd) (New York 1981) 106.

proved uncongenial to him;[84] however, it is also likely that Xenophon did not leave the army straightway because of his concern for the welfare of the soldiers, who had a lack of leadership and who wanted Xenophon to remain (7.7.57). When Agesilaus arrived in Asia in 396 B.C. (*Hellenica* 3.4.2-4) the Cyrean unit was integrated into the Spartan army and Herippidas was made its commander. It is quite likely that Xenophon, who had sufficient knowledge about Persia, remained with Agesilaus as a friend and advisor during the years 396 and 395 B.C.[85] He then most likely returned to Greece in 394 B.C. with Agesilaus, who had been recalled to fight at the battle of Coronea (Diogenes Laertius 2.51, *Hellenica* 4.3.1). It was at this time that Xenophon was most likely exiled from Athens.[86]

In spite of the disappointment and disillusionment that he felt after the Persian Expedition, Xenophon proved to be an extremely able and efficient leader of the Ten Thousand. In studying his strategy, tactics, piety, and means of discipline this becomes much more evident. His initiatives and inferences about generalship brought a new aspect to the art of leadership, as he was apparently the first western thinker to

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[84] Bury and Meiggs 331.

[85] Rahn 107.

[86] The exact date of Xenophon's exile has been disputed by scholars, such as Anderson (1974) 148, Higgins 22-24, and Watson 153, who suggest that Xenophon was exiled in 399 for having joined Cyrus in his expedition. Others, such as Christopher Tuplin, 'Xenophon's Exile Again', *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble.* Michael Whitby, Philip Hardie, Mary Whitby (edd) (Bristol 1987) 63, suggest that Xenophon was exiled in late 394 B.C. or early 393 B.C. A large problem is that Xenophon mentions his exile in the *Anabasis* only twice (5.3.7, 7.7.57); however, in neither of these descriptions does he mention the cause or date of his exile. The exact reading of 5.3.7 has been the cause for a number of discussions about the date of Xenophon's exile. Cawkwell (1972) (14), claims that the passage suggests that Xenophon was exiled in 398 or 397 B.C., while Delebecque (117-123) suggests the passage can mean that Xenophon was exiled in 399 B.C. or in 394 B.C. If Xenophon was indeed exiled in 394 B.C., we should examine the reasons for his banishment. The most probable reason is that Xenophon was accused of pro-Spartan sentiments stemming from his association with Agesilaus. At first, Xenophon's association with Agesilaus was not viewed as being a cause for banishment by the Athenians. Rahn (115) points out that between 403 B.C. and 395 B.C., no Athenians were condemned for pro-Spartanism since the Athenians followed a policy of pacification toward their conquerors. However, with the arrival of Lysander in Sparta in 395 B.C., the Athenians again became involved in external conflicts and banishment and exile again became a part of the political scene in Athens. If this is true, then Xenophon's association with Agesilaus would have been just cause for banishment due to his supposed anti-Athenian sentiment. As well, Persian support for Athens at around this same time would have given the Athenians an even greater reason for exiling Xenophon. It seems then, that Xenophon was exiled in late 394 or early 393 B.C., as an outcome of the political consequences of the Corinthian War and the alignment of Athens with Persia; both of which resulted in anti-Spartan views in Athens.

be deeply concerned with both military and political theory.[87] As he wrote in the *Memorabilia* (3.1.6) the duty of a general was much more than simply to know tactics; it required all the abilities of a man. The personal experiences learned by Xenophon during the expedition formed much of the basis of his treatises on genuine leadership; whether these could have been written if Xenophon did not accompany the Ten Thousand is difficult to say. The study of the Ten Thousand thus provides an examination of the leadership aspect of Xenophon. Though Xenophon is usually considered to be mainly an historian, his actions in the *Anabasis* show his worth and value as a leader and general. It is this very leadership of Xenophon that stands as a shining example of genuine leadership, and which elucidates both what constitutes such leadership and what its significance for the community can be.[88]

[87] Wood 33.
[88] Nussbaum 146.

CONCLUSION

In the study of Xenophon there still remain a few problems that should be examined. One of these problems is the reliability of Xenophon' *Anabasis*, not as much the facts of the expedition, but rather Xenophon's accounts of the quality of his own leadership. Although there are certain deficiencies in his work, Xenophon's account is the only full account that we have of the expedition, and thus it should be considered as the primary account. If other evidence arises which contradicts Xenophon, we should verify its reliability before contrasting it to Xenophon's account. In addition to this problem, there are some other concerns and analyses which should be brought up to aid in better understanding the worth of Xenophon and of the *Anabasis*.

In most respects, the *Anabasis* is an historical work dealing with an event in the history of Greece. Ainsworth refers to the work as being a preeminent piece of ancient military history,[1] thereby implying that the work was basically an historical work with military overtones. Fernand Robert also takes this view, and claims that we should not forget that above all the *Anabasis* is a military text.[2] Though there are other elements in the work, it is for the most part an historical work and is treated as such. Because of this the *Anabasis* has received its share of criticism for a number of reasons. One of these, which has already been stated, is the fact that its author was also the main figure, thereby presenting the possibility of self-glorification, and perhaps invalidating some of the historical accounts. Interestingly, Xenophon himself seems to have been aware of this, as in the *Hellenica* (3.1.2), he writes that the story of the Persian Expedition was written by Themistogenes of Syracuse, a name that is generally considered to be a pseudonym for Xenophon.[3] It is possible that Xenophon sacrificed the glory of authorship in order to obtain more credit and merit for his role in the book.[4] If for a moment we set aside the fact that Xenophon was both the writer and

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[1] William F. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand Greeks* (London 1844) v.
[2] Fernand Robert, 'Les intentions de Xenophon dans l'Anabase', *Information Litteraire* 2 (1950) 56.
[3] J. Roy, 'Xenophon's Evidence for the *Anabasis*', *Athenaeum* 46 (1968) 45. Cawkwell (1972) 17.
[4] Finley 381.

chief figure, we can better begin to understand it as an historical work. Simply enough, the *Anabasis* tells of the failed expedition of Cyrus and of the successful return of the Greek mercenaries. It provides an account of the Greek struggles in Persia by detailing the route of the march. In addition to this strictly historical account, it provides the reader with a glimpse of what the Persian empire was like, the territory and the people, and shows that perhaps it was not as invincible as it may have appeared to have been. This is a key fact in understanding the worth of the *Anabasis*. It portrayed Persia in a way that many may not have considered. On the one hand there were those who viewed Persia as the immense, impenetrable empire that it may have been before, in the time of Cyrus the Great or Xerxes. On the other hand, some viewed it as it was described by Isocrates, that it was degenerate and disjointed and ripe for the fall (*Panegyricus* 149). Persia seemed to be neither of these completely, but what was made evident through the *Anabasis* was this: a group of Greek mercenaries could successfully return from the heart of Persia, through unknown terrain, hostile enemies, and the constant threat of starvation. Cawkwell is quick to point out that the latter part of the march proved nothing about Persian military power, since the Kurdish hills were no longer Persian controlled territory.[5] However, the Greeks still were in constant threats from the native tribes. The result then is that it showed that the Ten Thousand were able to hold their own in extreme conditions.

What this in turn showed was that the Greeks, though they had been devastated by the Peloponnesian War, were still the same competent, brave soldiers that their forefathers had been at the beginning of the fifth century. We should recall that in one of Xenophon's first speeches, he reminded the Greeks how brave their fathers had been in defending Greece from the invasions of Darius and Xerxes (3.2.11-13). Xenophon encouraged them to be as brave as they had been, and in turn they, along with the help of the gods, would be successful. It is likely that Xenophon felt that the Greeks could return safely from Persia. As well, Xenophon may still have resented Persians like Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes, and still bitter about the death of Cyrus, have wished that Persia had been overthrown. On that note, it is quite possible

[5] Cawkwell (1972) 29.

that one of the reasons that Xenophon wrote the *Anabasis* was to make clear this point to the Greeks and to inspire the hope of military action against Persia.[6] We should remember that Xenophon most likely had strong panhellenic feelings and perhaps thought that a Persian invasion might aid in unifying the estranged Greek states. Hirsch mentions this possibility, that Xenophon's *Anabasis* intended to show his ideas and feelings that Greece ought to undertake a panhellenic crusade against Persia.[7] It is difficult to say whether this was Xenophon's motive or not, as Xenophon never mentions this explicitly. However, Xenophon lived in a time when the desire for a panhellenic crusade against Persia was quite widespread, and it is likely that Xenophon also shared this creed.[8] The fact that Xenophon returned to Persia to campaign with Agesilaus says something about his feelings towards Persia; as Cawkwell claims, both Xenophon and Agesilaus shared a desire to see Greece unite in a crusade against Persia.[9] Bearing these points in mind, we should thus not disregard the possibility that the *Anabasis* was written with the idea of a panhellenic crusade underlying it. If we consider the above sentiment, we should in turn consider other possibilities for why Xenophon wrote the *Anabasis*.

Among other reasons for the *Anabasis*, it has been suggested that he wrote it as an apologia in defense of his own conduct or as a response to Sophaenetus' account.[10] We must consider that the Ten Thousand were probably looked down on by many Greeks after their return; this is seen in Isocrates' description of them as being men who were incapable of living in their own cities (*Panegyricus* 146). Knowing how fondly Xenophon thought of his men, he must have wished to change the opinions about the Ten Thousand, and present them as brave and honorable soldiers rather than menial, corrupt individuals. As well, if this was the consensus about the Ten Thousand, how well could Xenophon, their leader, have been thought

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[6] Dillery 63. Agesilaus may have been influenced by the expedition of the Ten Thousand as he undertook his campaign a few years after Xenophon had. For later individuals, like Alexander the Great, it is possible that the *Anabasis* renewed the interest in a Persian invasion.
[7] Hirsch 14.
[8] Cawkwell (1972) 23.
[9] Cawkwell (1979) 12.
[10] E.g., Dillery 63.

of ? According to Cawkwell, Xenophon's captaincy of the rabble remnant at the Bosporus and in Thrace had earned him a bad reputation.[11] If we consider these points, then it is possible that he may have been seeking to bury once and for all the charges made long ago against his conduct and his character,[12] and thus he would have written the *Anabasis* as an apologia.

Yet another possibility is that the work was meant to be a treatise, a systematic discussion of facts and principles regarding ideal leadership in the setting of a Persian expedition. As such, it could be viewed in the same light as other works of Xenophon were, such as the *Hipparchicus* and the *Cyropaedia*. Granted, the *Hipparchicus* is more of a treatise than the *Cyropaedia*, but the *Cyropaedia*, like the *Anabasis*, superimposes an idealized treatise upon a historical background. In both of these works there is a distinct didactic element which suggests their classification as a treatise. Higgins claims that the *Anabasis* does not record the actions of historical men, and perhaps Xenophon never had historical precision uppermost in his mind as his chief aim.[13] Higgins' statement helps in understanding that the *Anabasis* was not a simple historical account of the March of the Ten Thousand. We should remember that Xenophon wrote for those who knew, and he felt that there was no need to explain to those who did not understand.[14] In this sense, it is very possible that the elements of a treatise were included in the work by Xenophon. As Hirsch points out, Xenophon clearly had a strong interest in education as his other treatises testify, and so it should not be surprising if the *Anabasis* has an instructional purpose.[15] If indeed it may have had the elements of a treatise, we should attempt to discover what those elements may have been. Delebecque suggests that one of Xenophon's chief aims was to show the theory of command by example; Xenophon took great pains to give weight to this doctrine.[16] The likelihood that the *Anabasis* contained the elements of a treatise on ideal leadership is quite possible. As well, a large factor which figures

[11] Cawkwell (1979) 12.
[12] Cawkwell (1972) 18.
[13] Higgins 95.
[14] Cawkwell (1979) 34.
[15] Hirsch 17.
[16] Delebecque 99.

throughout the *Anabasis* and very well may have been one of the reasons why Xenophon wrote it is that he wished to show the consequences of deceit and the rewards of trust and good faith.[17] The theme of trust and deceit is ever-present in the *Anabasis*, as Xenophon shows how the Greeks were threatened by and overcame Persian deceit and treachery in reaching Trapezus safely. The result of this is a work which expounded Xenophon's beliefs about deceit by friends and enemies, among other things. He thus may have written the *Anabasis* as an historical account, but also as a treatise expounding the virtues of honesty, piety, and goodness, and showing the results of impiety, treachery, and deceit: with goodness and piety almost anything could be achieved.

On this subject one minor point should be mentioned. If we consider that the *Anabasis* contains elements of a treatise about deceit, trust, virtue and piety, we should also briefly view it as a treatise about Xenophon's ideal community. As was made clear in the previous chapter, Xenophon viewed the Ten Thousand as a utopia, though it turned out to be a failed utopia for Xenophon. His experience among the Ten Thousand brought him into intimate contact with the dynamics of community life, both successful and unsuccessful, and this experience forged many of his later ideas regarding what constituted good and bad forms of political life.[18] Xenophon's other works, such as the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Poroi, Hiero* and parts of the *Cyropaedia* further show his interest in political life. Xenophon thus may have presented the Ten Thousand as a utopian community to those who could understand it. He never explicitly states that it was the ideal community, but as Dillery points out, the suggestion of its excellence is in its presentation: the index of its success being its continuing survival despite great odds, and the sign of its failure the eventual break-up.[19] The utopian aspect of the *Anabasis* thus furthers the idea of the work as being partially a treatise, as well as an historical account. Xenophon could not have presented the *Anabasis* as a simple historical account, for to him there was much more that could be told through the experiences of the Ten Thousand. The result is that the

[17] Hirsch 37.
[18] Dillery 64.
[19] Ibid 64.

Anabasis was first and foremost an historical account, but for those readers who understood Xenophon's methods, it was also an apologia, a call for a panhellenic crusade, and a treatise about virtue, piety, trust, deceit, and the overall makings of an ideal community.

The complexity and depth that is evident in the *Anabasis* in turn shows the overall worth of Xenophon the author. It should be clear by now that he was not primarily an historian like Thucydides or Herodotus, since he also wrote technical treatises and philosophical works. Nevertheless, he still can be compared with his predecessors as one of the three main Greek historians. Interestingly, in antiquity Xenophon was often thought of as a philosopher rather than an historian, which explains his perceived deficiencies as an historian.[20] This can be seen in Diogenes Laertius' account of Xenophon, which begins by mentioning that Xenophon was a pupil of Socrates and that he was the first to write a history of philosophers (Diogenes Laertius 2.48). As an historian Xenophon's work is sometimes found to be faulty in its details; however, this uneveness in his writing can perhaps be attributed to the fact that Xenophon had other interests which overshadowed a desire for complete accuracy in historical details. What should be realized though is that Xenophon should not be judged as a simple historian, but rather as a writer who filled his works with other elements. In essence, Xenophon was a man of his times, when poets and dramatists and historians were soldiers and generals and explorers.[21] As Neal Wood states, Xenophon was that rare combination of thought and action: warrior, sportsman, and farmer, who was able to write superbly on each of these activities.[22]

Often Xenophon has been criticized for failing to provide us with a precise and detailed account of Greek history, and for this reason his works are considered to be lacking something. We should consider, that unlike Xenophon, Thucydides never discusses the theory of the art of war and its implications for life as a whole.[23]

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[20] Brown 96. Wood (34) claims that Xenophon's works in history and philosophy suffered not from his own intellectual mediocrity as from the fact that they were overshadowed by the incomparable works of Thucydides and Plato.
[21] Hamilton 191.
[22] Wood 34.
[23] Wood 41.

Interestingly, Thucydides is never criticized for this as strict history, dealing with the events of a certain period, does not seem to need to include these elements. In this same respect, we must realize that the *Anabasis* is not a strictly historical account, but rather an autobiographical type of work based on an historical event filled with other subjects, such as the theories of leadership. For this reason, no longer should Xenophon be viewed as simply inferior to Thucydides, without the realization of his other merits. Although he was not an author of the highest rank, Xenophon was one of the first versatile Greek writer to include in his works history, travels, biography, memoirs, practical philosophy, romance, theories of government and of household management, military tactics, and handbooks on horsemanship, cavalry maneuvers, and hunting.[24] In this respect Xenophon's works are different, but equally important as Thucydides'. For just as Thucydides wrote that his work was not designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but rather was done to last forever,[25] so too was Xenophon's. As Xenophon points out in the *Cynegeticus*, he desired his work to be useful and to stand for all time unrefuted (13.7). Though Xenophon often has been criticized for being a lackluster historian, his multi-faceted works show that he stood alone in this respect and that he was a well-rounded and versatile individual. In this sense, we cannot fully understand the *Anabasis* until we realize that Xenophon's history was truly a history of his times, and that our concerns were not his concerns.[26] Until this is realized, Xenophon will probably still be criticized for writing works which are not exactly what we wish them to be.

The *Anabasis* shows not only the versatility of Xenophon as a writer, as do Xenophon's other works, but also as an individual. In the *Anabasis* we can see quite clearly that Xenophon was an able and efficient leader. It is also clear that his other interests and aptitudes enabled him to be an innovative and resourceful leader. As well, his experiences prior to the expedition gave him a widespread, eclectic, and diverse upbringing. For this reason Xenophon was quite well suited to lead the Ten Thousand. He had not been brought up to follow a certain method of leadership, but

[24] Hewitt and Mather 30.
[25] Thucydides 1.22
[26] Dillery 253.

rather was able to draw upon various elements of leadership that he had experienced, and was able to use his intuition and improvisation. As well, Xenophon had analyzed the military strategy and practice of his time and this surely influenced the way that he led the army. His actual leadership, as presented by him in the *Anabasis* also may have allowed other individuals, such as Agesilaus and Alexander the Great, to be influenced and to learn from his skills later on.

Xenophon's innovativeness in generalship, strategy, and tactics helped in evolving the theory of leadership, as he presented it in a way that was somewhat new. Xenophon had a highly original conception of the social nature of the army, and this basic insight led to perhaps his most significant accomplishment, an elementary theory of leadership.[27] He must then be regarded as the first one to analyze systematically the nature of the conduct of war and to present his findings.[28] His leadership in the *Anabasis* was dependent upon these findings, and thus helped constitute a development in fourth-century leadership. It seems safe to say that Xenophon's actual leadership of the Ten Thousand enabled him to develop further his ideas and beliefs on military theory and the theory of leadership, by allowing him to witness firsthand his convictions and ideologies in practice. Overall, we can therefore see that Xenophon did help in evolving the theory of leadership through his successful leadership of the Ten Thousand, and through his accounts of it in the *Anabasis*.

[27] Wood 60.
[28] Delbrück 159.

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